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Abstract 
Petro-states are vulnerable to sudden oil price crashes because of their over-reliance on oil revenue 
to fuel their economic growth, stabilize currency rate and finance their government spending. A 
drastic oil price slump will cause the oil wealth of petro-states to swiftly dissipate, forcing the 
affected countries to confront the underlying fragility of their economies and run the real danger 
of economic collapse. This paper attempts to establish the theory that an oil price crash will make 
petro-states spiral into economic demise and political instability.  
 
This paper will use the case study of the 1985 oil price crash to demonstrate the validity of the 
theory. It will highlight the impact of the declining oil wealth on the five petro-states, namely 
Venezuela, the Soviet Union, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Our theory will show the 
importance of two essential factors: fiscal reserves and economic diversification. It postulates that 
petro-states may only escape economic catastrophe and political turmoil if either one of the two 
pivotal factors is present. Since the 2014 oil price crash bears stunning similarity to the 1985 crisis. 
We will apply the theory to analyze the situation of today. While Indonesia is immune to oil 
price crash, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Algeria are all suffering various degrees of economic 
backlash and looming political woes. Our conjecture indicates that Venezuela is now suffering the 
worst economic crisis in its history. Political instability is bound to take place in this petro-state. 
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Introduction 
 
A petro state’s survival in some cases is almost entirely dependent on steady and lucrative oil 
revenue. They are able to rest on their own laurels and cling to the notion that oil earnings will 
grease the wheels of economy and contribute to incomes to sustain the economic development 
and political stability of their regime. However, oil revenue is a double-edged sword which can 
destabilize a regime when oil prices crash.  
 
The drastic movement of oil prices from peak to trough since June 2014 has taken the global oil 
market aback and sent shock waves through all the petro-states. As the energy economist Douglas 
Reynolds put it, oil price shock stops an economy the same way as an empty fuel tank stalls a car.1 
The price crunch has caused the oil wealth of petro-states to swiftly dissipate, forcing the 
affected countries to confront the underlying fragility of their economies and run the real danger 
of economic collapse.  
 
When petro-states find themselves stuck in a worn-out economy, the impact will be detrimental 
not just on the economic front but also in terms of political stability. Nevertheless, there is a dearth 
of research regarding how an oil price crash will affect the petro-states from the viewpoint of 
political stability or the connection between petro-states and their propensity to become 
failed states. As the world contemplates oil prices not bouncing back to their previous highs in the 
near future, such a relative academic void calls for more timely research into the political impact 
of the fall in oil price on petro-states.  
 
In light of these facts, this paper will seek to tackle two main questions: what will the impact of 
the oil price crash be on the economic stability of petro-states when their lifeblood is so dependent 
on oil wealth? In addition to crippling the economy, will the price crash erode the social fabric of 
petro-states and finally engender political instability?  
 
In what follows, this paper attempts to demonstrate one main theory: that the oil price crash 
does cause political instability in petro-states. The paper will argue that the oil price crash will 
first cause a petro-state’s economy to spin out of control and result in economic calamity. It will 
                                            
1Andrew Nikiforuk, “What Really Killed Soviet Union? Oil Shock?,” The Tyee, March 13, 2013, accessed July 21, 
2016, http://thetyee.ca/News/2013/03/13/Soviet-Union-Oil/. 
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then throw the state’s political establishment into a tailspin and spark political turmoil. Our theory 
highlights the importance of two essential factors: fiscal reserves and economic diversification. It 
postulates that petro-states may only escape economic catastrophe and political turmoil if either 
one of these two pivotal factors is present: a) strong fiscal reserves and b) timely and successful 
economic diversification. This paper will argue that size does matter. If a petro-state has 
accumulated sufficient fiscal reserves and saved for a rainy day, it will have the means to 
withstand the oil price crash both economically and politically. A petro-state will also be able to 
weather the economic storm and enjoy political stability if it has diversified its economy in a timely 
and successful manner before the oil crash descends.   
 
History is a useful guide to the future. One cannot construct a meaningful analysis without a critical 
review of the lessons learnt from yesterday. In order to achieve a more convincing result, one has 
to be reacquainted with the 1985 oil price slump and today’s one, as the two crashes are stunningly 
similar. This paper will examine the impact of the 1985 oil price crash2 on five major petro-states, 
namely the Soviet Union (aka the USSR), Venezuela, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. With 
the oil revenue being slashed by more than half, what was the economic aftermath on these petro-
states and their respective political situations in those days? Through a case study of the Soviet 
Union, Venezuela and Algeria, we will present empirical evidence to affirm the validity of our 
theory: the 1985 oil price crash was a fundamental and immediate cause of the economic malaise 
of the petro-states at that time. It was the oil price slash that finally drove the countries to the state 
of political turmoil as a result of economic calamity.  
 
Nonetheless, there are exceptions. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia could weather the oil price storm 
and steer away from troubled waters despite the sharp fall in oil revenue in 1985. Their relative 
immunity to political turbulence has reaffirmed the principle arguments of our theory: the 
existence of strong fiscal reserves and successful economic diversification can prevent petro-states 
from suffering the same fate of countries with much weaker fiscal reserves and an economic model 
of over-reliance on oil.  
 
The turbulent past events of 1985 provide some useful lessons to tackle today’s situation. From 
the insights gathered through the case study, this paper will assess whether the five petro-
states chosen can reconcile the historic shocks of 1985 with the challenges of today, or whether 
they will repeat a history of political turmoil in the face of the 2014 oil price crash.3    
                                            
2 1985 oil price crash stands for 1985-1986 oil price crash 
3 2014 oil price crash denotes the oil crash erupted in June till April 2015 
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Main Body  
 
As the then Venezuelan President Carlos Andre Pérez once posited: an oil price spike is bad for 
everyone but worst for developing countries that have oil. It is a trap.4 Petro-states with abundant 
wealth generated from oil exports can enjoy certain level of economic prosperity and political 
stability. As scholars have put it, a petro-state’s survival in some cases is depended on the steady 
export of oil and a heavy influx of petrodollars. The source of a lucrative income has allowed them 
to support domestic social safety nets, curry favour with their populace and sustain economic 
growth. Hooked on the oil revenue, petro-states in times of an oil boom era can enjoy windfall 
gain to legitimize their rule and strengthen their social solidarity.  
 
Paradoxically, the scenario of plenty could destabilize oil-exporting countries. While oil prices 
began to fall from above a hundred in June 2014 to as low as US$27 per barrel in January 2016, 5 
many petro-states descend into a dark age. With their lifeblood oil revenues under serious threat, 
they suffer adversely as they see their fiscal reserves depleting, GDP growth decelerating, debt 
rising and the overall economy waning. Despite the recent rebound to US$50 per barrel, 6 many 
academics hold a bearish outlook and conjecture that any return to triple-digit oil prices lies in the 
distant future.7 
 
It is evident that petro-states are undergoing various degrees of economic pressure. 
Vulnerable countries like Venezuela are facing all manners of economic calamity and social 
disruption.8 Though past performance is no guarantee of future results, it may shed light on what 
may lie ahead. To gain a better understanding of how petro-states will develop, we make reference 
to vents from the previous oil crash in order to analyze the situation of petro-states today and how 
to assess their likelihood to fall prey to instability. We will that the repercussions of oil revenues 
plunge will likely to be domestic political instability and the increasing fragility of the state.    
                                            
4 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remarking of the Modern World (New York: Penguin Books,  
2012), 114 
5 Patti Domm and Tom DiChristopher, “US oil falls on unexpectedly large inventory build”, CNBC, January 20, 
2016, accessed July 18, 2016, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/19/oil-prices-fall-further-on-glut-worries-us-crude-
slumps-below-28.html. 
6 Barani Krishnan, “Oil hits 2016 high on U.S. draw forecasts, Nigeria woes,” Reuters, June 7, 2016, accessed July 
18, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil-idUSKCN0YS00Z. 
7 “The Geopolitics of oil: analyzing the effects of production and investment on global oil prices,” 
Harvard International Review, September 2, 2015, accessed July 18, 2016, http://hir.harvard.edu/the-geopolitics-of-
oil-analyzing-the-effects-of-production-and-investment-on-global-oil-prices/. 
8 “Venezuela: Edge of the Precipice”, Crisis Group, accessed July 18, 2016, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/venezuela/b035-venezuela-edge-of-the-precipice.pdf. 
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This paper will divide into four main sections. Firstly, it will define the questions – what is meant 
by “oil price crash” and what constitutes “political instability”. This section will also include a core 
section – the theory of the research. Secondly, it will elaborate the methodology and the reasons 
for selecting the 1985 oil price crash as the dominant period of study and the rationale for choosing 
the five petro-states for case study. Thirdly, it will include the most important section – the 
overall case study of the five petro-states. It will present empirical evidence to establish and justify 
our theory.  
 
 
Arguments abound to illustrate how the Soviet Union, Venezuela and Algeria confirm our theory 
as they ended up in states of political instability after the 1985 price slash. We will use the cases 
of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia to further argue that the existence of the two factors is crucial to a 
state’s survival in times of oil price shock: fiscal reserves and economic diversification.  
 
 
Lastly, it will move on to the application of the theory to today’s situation, to assess the political 
repercussions and come up with a prognosis in the wake of the new recent oil price crash.   
 
 
First: Definitions and Theory  
 
 
Before one approaches the question of whether the oil price crash will cause political stability of 
the petro-states, it is of necessary to clearly define what is meant by “oil price crash”. We choose 
to define it as a continuous and drastic dive in the global oil price on a scale of over 50% within a 
time span of one year. In history there were four significant oil price crashes which resulted in an 
extreme plunge in price in the range of 59%9 to 72%10 in a year. These crises encompass the ones 
starting in the year of 1985, 1997, 2008 and 2014.11 The 1985 one was mostly associated with a 
significant shift in OPEC policy;12 in 1997 and 2008 the drops were triggered by financial crises.13 
The latest episode in 2014 was the third largest price slide, initiated by an oil supply glut and an 
                                            
9 “Oil Price Plunge Is So 1986…,” Morgan Stanley, April 2, 2015, accessed July 18, 2016, 
http://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/oil-price-plunge-is-so-1986. 
10 Benjamin Sinclair, “The Oil Price Plunge: Is This a Repeat of 1998 or 1986?,” The Motley Fool, February 6, 
2015, accessed July 18, 2016, http://www.fool.ca/2015/02/06/the-oil-price-plunge-is-this-a-repeat-of-1998-or-1986/. 
11 John Baffes, M. Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge and Marc Stocker, “Policy Research Note - The Great Plunge 
in Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses,” World Bank Group, published in March 2015, 
accessed July 21, 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Research/PRN01_Mar2015_Oil_Prices.pdf.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
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eventual shift in OPEC policy.14 In the latter part we will explain the rationale behind the selection 
of 1985 and 2014 price crashes.  
 
To dissect the political consequences arising from the oil crash, it is essential to give a clear 
definition of “political instability”. There are different interpretations of “political instability”. 
It covers legal changes of heads of state and political changeovers as well as less dramatic events 
linked to social unrest such as demonstrations and political violence. 15  Some define it as 
the changes in political power through violence and regular changes in the due process of law.16 
Some scholars describe “political instability” as the propensity for a change in the executive, either 
by constitutional or unconstitutional means, in a country.17 Political stability is also defined as the 
open exercise of violence such as in a civil war, rebellion or a coup d’état. Civil war is perceived to 
be a supreme form of political instability.18 This paper will adopt the definition of the propensity 
for the change in the head of state and the appearance of civil war, rebellion or a coup d’état. To 
gauge the impact of the oil price crash, this paper will assess its impact over the course of seven 
years from the eruption of the oil price dip.   
 
Oil price crashes engender the fall of oil empire  
 
As mentioned earlier, this paper will testify one main theory – drastic falls in oil price cause 
political instability in petro-states. The research will be presented in two folds. First, an oil 
price crash will cause the petro-state’s economy to tumble. The state will then experience all 
sorts of social disruption, coupled with various sorts of austerity policies, which will later throw 
the state into an irreversible course of political turmoil.  
 
Our theory postulates that the existence of two essential factors can save an oil kingdom from 
falling apart: a) strong fiscal reserves and b) timely and successful economic diversification. With 
the presence of either of these factors, the petro-states can withstand a certain level of economic 
                                            
14 Ibid. 
15 Jean-Claude Berthélemy, Céline Kauffmann, Laurence Renard and Lucia Wegner, “Political instability, political 
regimes and economic performance in African countries (First draft, March 11, 2002),” accessed July 25, 2016, 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2002-upagissa/papers/kauffmann-csae2002.pdf. 
16 Said Jaouadi, Lamia Arfaoui and Azza Ziedi, “Political Instability and Growth: Case of the Developing 
Countries,” International Journal of Social Science Research 2(1) (2014): 19-28. 
17 Alberto Alesina, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel, “Political instability and economic growth,” 
Journal of Economic Growth 1(2) (1996): 189-211. 
18 Anders Sundell, “Stability and Stagnation,” in Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government, ed. Carl 
Dahlström and Lena Wängnerud (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 
 Page 9 of  89 
 
reverberation and avert political tremor. The state either has funds to plug the hole in its revenue 
supply or an intensifying diversified economy to weather the crunch of oil price crash.  
  
Undoubtedly, many other factors can contribute to economic malaise and political instability in a 
petro-state, such as democratization level, corruption issues, ethnic and religious tensions 
and geopolitical risks. This paper will focus purely on the study of oil price crashes and their 
relationship with instability in petro-states. Factors such as geopolitical concerns, regime types, 
internal rife due to ethnicity and religion as well as corruption problems will not be considered.  
 
Second: Methodology  
 
This project is primarily qualitative in nature, and supplemented with some quantitative data (e.g. 
oil prices, oil revenues and economic indicators of the countries selected). Research 
was conducted with a focus on oil-related economic crises and political instability within the five 
selected countries in seven years after the oil price clash in 1985. The study attempts to show that 
the oil price clash was correlated to the general economic crisis, as well as consequential political 
instability in petro-states. The methodology utilized in researching this capstone project 
involved the collection of open source information from academic journals, books and intelligence 
agencies; private and public oil sector reports and country reports; and historical and current media 
stories.  
 
Period of study: 1985 oil price crash vs 2014 oil price crash 
 
To gain a more representative assessment, this paper has chosen the period of oil price drop 
erupted in November 1985 as the case in point. This long period of oil price depression was worth 
a diagnosis as it bears a stunning similarity to the latest oil price crash which commenced in June 
2014. The latest episode has two key parallels to that of 1985 in terms of the magnitude of price 
drop and the cause of the event.19  
                                            
19 “Oil Price Plunge Is So 1986…,” Morgan Stanley, April 2, 2015, accessed July 18, 2016, 
http://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/oil-price-plunge-is-so-1986. 
John Baffes, M. Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge, and Marc Stocker, “Policy Research Note - The Great Plunge in 
Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses,” World Bank Group, published in March 2015, 
accessed July 21, 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Research/PRN01_Mar2015_Oil_Prices.pdf.  
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First, both the price crashes experienced a dive of over 60% in just a few months. The oil price 
plummeted 69% between November 1985 and April 1986. Compare that with the latest oil dive 
by almost 60% from highs above US$120 per barrel in June 2014 to US$45 per barrel as of mid-
March 2015, the similarly of magnitude is uncanny.20 Both echo the definition of oil price crashes 
adopted in this paper: a drastic fall in prices on a scale of over 50% within a time span of one year. 
The shock of 2014 oil price crash is still with us today as the price is still hovering at the low level 
of $48 per barrel in June 2016. 21    
 
For ease of reading, we will describe the two oil price crashes of this study by naming them by the 
beginning year, instead of spelling out the full period of crashes. The case of 1985-1986 will be 
named “1985 oil price crash” while 2014-2015 crash will be entitled as “2014 oil price crash”.  
 
 
In another parallel with today, both episodes were triggered by the boom in oil supplies from non-
OPEC countries and a sea change in the OPEC’s policy in face of sluggish global demand.22 Back 
                                            
20 “Oil Price Plunge Is So 1986…,” Morgan Stanley, April 2, 2015, accessed July 18, 2016, 
http://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/oil-price-plunge-is-so-1986. 
21 “Short-term energy outlook”, U.S. Energy Information Administration, July 12, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016, 
https://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/prices.cfm. 
22 John Baffes, M. Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge, and Marc Stocker, “Policy Research Note - The Great Plunge 
in Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses,” World Bank Group, published in March 2015, 
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then, OPEC tried to preserve its market share by reducing prices to a level it hoped would choke 
off higher-cost supplies from the rest of the world, in particular the emerging supplies of North 
Sea oil.23 Today the recent oil boom from unconventional sources resembles the expansion of oil 
supplies from the North Sea. The oil glut was produced by the shale oil renaissance in the 
United States, and to a lesser degree, from Canadian oil sands. Saudi Arabia decided to stop 
propping up oil prices by ramping up production in order to quickly regain its market share in the 
world. It intended to cause a price crash that would hurt Saudi Arabia's rivals and shale oil industry, 
bring them into line and burn off high-cost competitors elsewhere.24  
 
 
The selection of the case study  
 
The five countries were selected for their adherence to the petro-state criteria, namely the amount 
of oil exports per year and the ratio of oil revenues to GDP. Since there is no general consensus 
on the definition of petro-states, this paper will adopt a hybrid definition drawn from different 
sources. Petro-states will be defined as having oil exports amounting to at least 10% of annual 
GDP in order to be classified as a petro-state in any given year.25 It must be an oil exporting country 
with exports exceeding imports.  
 
 
The entire world has a total of 33 petro-states.26 The selection of five petro-states as a sample size 
should be adequate, especially the five countries of such diversity, spanning across five different 
regions, namely Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, the Soviet Union/Russia in Eurasia, Algeria in 
Africa, Venezuela in Latin America and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. They are varied in ethnicity, 
religious backgrounds and democratic systems which render us a more comprehensive 
and insightful analysis.  
                                            
accessed July 21, 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Research/PRN01_Mar2015_Oil_Prices.pdf.  
23 “Lessons from the 1986 Oil crash,” Lombard Street Research, January 20, 2015, accessed July 21, 2016, 
http://www.lombardstreetresearch.com/lsrlink.php?T=MQ==&F=NjQ2. 
24 John Baffes, M. Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge, and Marc Stocker, “Policy Ressearch Note - The Great Plunge 
in Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses,” World Bank Group, published in March 2015, 
accessed July 21, 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Research/PRN01_Mar2015_Oil_Prices.pdf. 
25 Jeff Colgan, “When Does Oil Cause War? Petro-Aggression and Revolutionary Governments,” New Security 
Beat (blog of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Programme), February 6, 2013, 
accessed July 18, 2016, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/02/oil-war-petro-aggression-revolutionary-
governments/. 
   Jeff Colgan, “Oil and Revolutionary Regimes: A Toxic Mix,” (presentation at the International Political Economy 
Society Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 2008). 
26 Jeff Colgan, “Oil and Revolutionary Regimes: A Toxic Mix,” (presentation at the International Political Economy 
Society Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 2008). 
 Page 12 of  89 
 
 
Third: Case Study  
 
 
In what follows, we will present the case study of five petro-states in the period of 1985 to 1992. 
Through the performance of the Soviet Union, Venezuela, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 
in crisis, we will attempt to justify the validity of our theory – an oil price crash does engender 
political turmoil.  
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The Soviet Union 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union could be told as a story of oil.27 It affirms our theory by showing 
that the breakdown of the Soviet empire was a result of the plunging oil prices starting in 
November 1985. It was this sudden and unexpected price dip that first caused dramatic declines in 
the oil revenues of the Soviet Union and brought the economy to the verge of collapse. When the 
economy was on the brink of bankruptcy, social unrest, widespread riots, military mobilization 
and political crises ensued, which finally prompted the then President Gorbachev to resign and the 
empire to fall apart at the end of 1991. 
 
 
In the following section, we will elaborate on the importance of oil revenues to the economy of 
the Soviet Union. We will go into great detail to demonstrate that the fall in oil price was a major 
factor causing the Soviet economy to crumble. The oil price crash shook the very foundation of 
the Soviet economy by causing their hard currency revenues to diminish. With the fast dwindling 
reserves, the country exhausted all feasible means and was unable to provide food supply, repay 
its burgeoning debts and balance the fiscal account in an era of hyperinflation and currency 
devaluation. As a result, the economic malaise finally sparked political tremors that finally torn 
the Soviet empire apart.  
 
 
The case study echoes with our theory which postulates the indispensable roles of two main factors: 
1) strong fiscal or hard currency reserves and 2) economic diversification. Without sufficient 
reserves, the Soviet Union could hardly survive the economic catastrophe. The inability of the 
Soviet government to diversify itself from oil dependence made the country even harder to turn 
around the tragic political downfall.  
 
 
I. Oil revenues: the lifeblood of the Soviet Union 
 
 
Oil wealth had been the lifeblood of the Soviet economy since 1977.28 The quantity of Soviet’s oil 
exports had drastically increased in the previous decade. In 1972, fuel exports, largely oil, 
                                            
27 “The Soviet Collapse,” American Enterprise Institute, published April 2007, accessed July 18, 2016, 
https://www.aei.org/feature/the-soviet-collapse/. 
28 “USSR Energy Atlas: CIA Historical Review Program (release in full 1999),” Central Intelligence Agency, 
published January 1985, accessed July 16, 2016, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000292326.pdf. 
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accounted for 16.6% of the Ruble value of Soviet exports to all socialist countries and 19.8% of 
the hard currency value of exports to the industrialized West and non-Communist 
developing countries. By 1979, the share of these oil exports had risen to 50% in total.29 Oil had all 
along constituted a large proportion of exports from the Soviet Union. When the oil output 
peaked in 1987, the Soviet Union produced 624 million tons of oil, more than the United States or 
Saudi Arabia.30  
 
 
By the same token, the Soviet Government’s balance of payments in hard currency 
depended heavily on oil exports (crude oil and oil products). The oil revenues contributed greatly 
to sustaining the Soviet economy and funding social needs, such as imports of grain and other 
foodstuffs as well as consumer goods essential to society in order to maintain social stability.31 
Thanks to the enormous oil boom from 1971 to 1981 aided by growing production in oil fields 
such as Volga Oil Basin and Western Siberia, the Soviet Union had begun enjoying an explosion 
in oil revenue. From 1970 to 1977 alone, the increase in Soviet-held hard currency brought by 
windfall revenue allowed the Soviet Union to purchase US$14.2 billion more imports with 
hard currency than otherwise would have been possible. This windfall gain was equivalent to 21% 
of the cumulative value of the Soviet hard currency merchandise exports from 1971 to 1977.32 Oil 
rents accruing to the Soviet Union increased from only several billion dollars per year in the early 
1970s to well over US$260 billion dollars per year in 1981.33 The oil price spike benefitted from 
the Iranian Revolution in the early 1980s34 helped further support the faltering Soviet economy. 
Oil exports generated 60% of all its hard currency. The easy money offered the Soviet 
policymakers limited maneuverability in exploring other hard-currency earners substituting oil 
exports.35 
 
 
                                            
29 U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and Soviet Energy Availability (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 254. 
30 Adnan Vatansever, “Russia’s Oil Exports: Economic Rationale Versus Strategic Gains,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, December 15, 2010, accessed July 15, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/12/15/russia-s-
oil-exports-economic-rationale-versus-strategic-gains. 
31 Gregory Grossman and Ronald L. Solberg, “The Soviet Union’s Hard-Currency Balance of Payments 
and Creditworthiness in 1985,” The Rand Corporation, published in April 1983, accessed July 17, 2016, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R2956.pdf. 
32 U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and Soviet Energy Availability (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 255. 
33 Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire – Lesson for Modern Russia (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution 
Press, 2007), 102. 
34 Anita Demkiv, “Political Instability in petrostates: the myth of reality of oil revenues as petrostate stabilizer” 
(PhD diss., The State University of New Jersey, 2012). 
35 Robert W. Campbell, “Review,” The Energy Journal, 10(1) (January 1989): 189  
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The windfall gain of petro-money enabled the Soviet Union to depend even more on oil revenues 
to fund the state’s expenditure without resorting to any significant economic reform that might 
alter the institutional framework.36 It allowed the country to embark on a development trajectory 
by using easily accessible oil revenues to solve the increasingly complex social, economic 
and political problems confronting them. The hard currency also helped the country avert a 
growing food supply crisis, increase the imports of equipment and consumer goods, and provide a 
financial basis for the pursuit of the arms race with the United States whilst at the same time 
maintaining social stability.37  
 
 
II. Oil price crash triggered the economic malaise  
 
 
Shrinking fiscal reserves: hard currency deficit 
 
As oil exports were nearly the single source for this largely isolated country’s hard currency, when 
the oil prices began to plummet in November 1985, a dark age descended on the economy of the 
Soviet Union. Moscow juggled revenue and expenditure to maintain some semblance of balance 
in its hard currency position. 38  Oil revenues fell several-fold when the Soviet Union 
pocketed fewer dollars from oil exports. The price collapse immediately triggered a country-wide 
hard currency crisis which evolved into a growing economic malaise engulfing the whole country.  
 
 
According to the scholar Martin McCuley, each dollar fall per barrel led to the loss of 
approximately US$300 million of hard-currency reserves in the Soviet Union.39  The drop in 
price caused US$20 billion of oil revenue to be dissipated immediately every year.40 As per an 
assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), oil earnings plummeted swiftly from 
US$15.2 billion between 1982 and 1984 to US$7 billion by 1986.41 In the early 1980s, Moscow 
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was still running a hard-currency trade surplus of more than US$4 billion a year. Nonetheless, as 
a result of the oil price dip, the surplus shrank to US$534 million in 1985 despite a 6% decline in 
imports.42  
 
 
In view of the sudden loss of oil income, the Soviet government made a bold attempt to increase 
oil investment by pumping an increase of 47% in capital spending between 1985 and 1989 into the 
oil fields in order to increase oil production and offset some of the loss in revenue.43 
 
 
Nevertheless, from 1980 onwards, as exploration and production costs increased during the 
period of low oil price, the rate of increase in investment outstripped the rents derived from oil 
production.44 Soviet oil as a result was produced at a significant economic loss in 1987, when the 
government had to subsidize both domestic consumption and oil export.45 Even though the country 
was pumping more oil, it was not enough to bail out its sinking economy.46 
 
 
The oil price slash constituted a major blow to the Soviet hard-currency position with a heavy 
drain on their currency funds currency funds that the Soviet Union desperately needed to pay for 
imports. 47 
 
 
To offset the shortfall in hard-currency, Yegor Gaidar and certain other scholars have stated that 
the Soviet leadership faced a hard choice: whether to reduce the social spending in support of 
social stability and state security or let the economy further decline. Presented with them were five 
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options: a) cutting food imports; b) increasing arms sales; c) reducing military complex; d) dipping 
into gold stocks; or e) borrowing more.48  
 
 
Nonetheless, echoing the discourse of “the revised Midas touch”49 – the government was reluctant 
to cut back on spending when revenues fell and was caught in a quandary to maintain social 
stability.50 Hence, none of the options seemed workable in rescuing the ailing economy.   
 
 
a. Cut food imports 
 
Top in the country’s pressing social needs was food imports. 51  Due to its endemic 
agricultural crisis, the Soviet Union had been importing grains from the West since 1963 to feed its 
population and by the mid-1980s it was the world’s largest importer.52 Soviet purchases of grain 
jumped from 2.2 million tons in 1970 to 46 million in 1984.53 By the mid-1980s, every third ton 
of baked goods was made from grain imports. Cattle rearing also relied on imported grain. As 
grain imports had to be paid for by convertible currency, dwindling hard currency reserves 
presented the Soviet leadership with the threat of insufficient grain imports. 54  The Soviet 
Union could have drastically reduced Soviet food imports by US$20 billion. According to Gaidar, 
this was exactly the amount the Soviet Union lost when oil prices crashed in 1985.55 However, this 
option was infeasible as the amount cut would have meant the re-introduction of food rationing 
with a magnitude resembling the World War II56 and in return would have triggered great social 
unrest.  It would be an act of political suicide.  
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b. Increase arms sales  
 
The Soviet Government could have increased arms sales to compensate for the loss in export 
revenues. Prima facie the value of arms sales jumped. 57  However, many deals were 
financed by credit extensions to less developed countries. Thus the Soviet’s hard currency 
appeared only on paper.58 The increased financial difficulties of several Arab countries due to 
declining oil revenue meant increased Soviet difficulties in maintaining a high level of real 
hard-currency arms sales in the region.59 
 
 
c. Reduce military-industrial complex 
 
The Soviet Union could have implemented radical cuts in military-industrial complex 
and streamlined its manpower.60 As a large number of national employment depended on the 
armed forces, by employing this option the Soviet leadership would have risked serious conflicts 
with the armed forces.61 Social unrest would have been the inevitable result.  
 
 
d. Dip into gold reserves  
 
The Soviet Union had vast gold reserves to guarantee grain imports and bolster the economy. 
However, after oil earnings began declining in late 1985, the Soviet Union compensated for the 
fall in revenue by jetting up the sales of gold to more than 300 tons in 1986 to exchange for 
hard currency.62 Gold reserves were quickly reduced to approximately US$7.6 billion in 1988 
and might have been depleted completely. In this case, they could not be a way out in the long 
run.63  
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e. Borrow more 
 
As the Soviet Government could not alleviate “the reversed Midas touch” by reducing social 
spending, the easiest way forward was to borrow more to keep money flowing64. Meanwhile, the 
Soviet leadership chose to disregard the growing economic problem in the hope that the oil price 
would somehow rebound and that the problem would simply go away. But as the debt kept 
ballooning, it inevitably resulted in a debt crisis.   
 
 
Soaring debt crisis 
 
The Soviet leadership chose to count on foreign debt to cover shortfalls in hard currency caused by 
declining world oil prices.65 This saw a drastic surge in state debts from US$42 billion Rubles in 
1986 to US$312.4 billion Rubles at the start of 1989 and then to US$400 billion Rubles or 44% of 
GDP in the late 1989. The state continued to live beyond its means with state debt soaring. 
The currency owed on foreign debt for 1991 was US$20.7 billion.66  
 
 
The Soviet Union was so desperate to create a consortium of 300 banks to provide a US$100 
billion loan for the Soviet Union to prop up the oil-dependent economy in 1989. Despite the 
pressing need, the loan raised was 20 times smaller than needed. Only five banks participated.67 
The total Soviet hard-currency debt increased appreciably, and the Soviet Union, which had an 
impeccable debt repayment record in earlier decades, had accumulated sizable arrears by 1990.68 
 
 
The economy fell apart with no immediate provision of sufficient loans from the West. This 
resulted in looming catastrophe of food and basic necessity shortages. With the fiscal deficit 
growing without enough hard currency to support the expenditure, the bank started to lose control 
of currency circulation with the consequence that some republics like Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia started printing their own money. The then Finance Ministry predicted there would be 
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nothing left to pay the army and the navy and to support administrative structure. Pensions were 
also under threat. 69  The Soviet Government was on the brink of declaring bankruptcy with 
insufficient hard-currency to sustain necessary expenditure. In 1991 the Soviet GDP 
had declined 17% and was declining at an accelerating rate.70 
 
 
Famine on the horizon 
 
With dwindling fiscal reserves and insufficient loans, the Soviet Union experienced chronic delay 
in payments for imported goods including food imports. With no creditworthiness, the Soviet 
Union found it harder to import food to feed the mouths of its huge population. The country 
risked extreme shortage of both bread supplies for its human population and concentrated feed for 
animal husbandry.  
 
 
The shortage began to take their toll on daily life when the Council of Ministers decided in 1990 
to raise retail price of bread and rolls by 300%, of grain by 290% in 1990, of meat by 90%, of 
sausages by 310% and the price of other baked goods by 300%. Food rationing was 
introduced and skyrocketing prices were the result. According to the then Head of Department of 
Agro-industrial sector, reserves of food grain in the Soviet Union would be exhausted by the end of 
March 1991.71 The available stock of flour throughout the Soviet Union was 1.5 million tons, 
which would satisfy demand for only fifteen days.72 The unstable supply of grain made delivery a 
problem thus causing further destabilization in society. The Council of Ministers of the Soviet 
Union, Stephan Sitarian wrote in April 1990: “Today a number of foreign firms stopped shipping 
goods to the Soviet Union, and ships loaded with grains have been lying idle in ports”.73 By the 
middle of summer 1991, the food deficit was almost ubiquitous. The Soviets eventually 
endured their inflation shock in October 1989 when their currency was devalued by 90%74. The 
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Soviet Union not only fervently demanded, it also openly appealed to the West for philanthropic 
aid.75 
 
 
III. Political instability an inevitable result 
 
 
Without an abundant source of income to maintain a balanced budget, the doom of the regime was 
inevitable when the long awaited political shake-up finally arrived. The Soviet Union first 
experienced the disintegration of the Eastern European bloc and mounting riots and protests across 
its own country. The complete fall of the Soviet communist regime was in sight.  
 
 
Mounting social unrest  
 
As a result of the price increase and shortage of food, wearing apparel and other basic necessities, 
sociopolitical unrest grew more acute. The general quality of life for Soviet consumers deteriorated. 
The mounting economic difficulties, shortages in the food markets undermined the legitimacy of 
the regime and mass protests against the communist regime ensued. The severe food shortage 
prompted citizens to demonstrate against the government. For instance, the miners’ strike in the 
summer of 1989 was caused by the lack of food in the mining regions.76  Confidence in the 
government was melting away fast with the looming famine.   
 
 
Fueled by the liberalized atmosphere of President Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost (literally, public 
voicing) and by the increase in information access in the late 1980s, public disenchantment was 
overt. Mark Beisinger has compiled a list of mobilization episodes in the Soviet Union up to the 
day of its collapse. 6,663 protest demonstrations and 2,177 incidents of mass violence took place 
from January 1986 to December 1992. The country experienced an accelerating pace of street 
protests and a rising tide of popular unrest in the late Gorbachev era, thus shaking the foundation 
of the Soviet empire.77   
 
Disintegration of Eastern Europe bloc   
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The Soviet Government had been using hard currency subsidies and oil exports as a political 
instrument to stabilize satellite regimes or the so-called Comecon countries of Easter Europe since 
the 1950s. Nevertheless, prompted by serious hard currency problems, the Soviet Union chose to 
reduce the annual delivery of oil to Easter Europe and preferred to export oil to importers who 
paid in hard currency. To save oil for its own needs, it even started to charge Eastern Europe 
hard currency and at global prices for its oil from 1988.78 Without free oil, the Eastern Europe 
economies went into a virtual tailspin.79 The socialist camp thereby accumulated more foreign debt 
owed to the West to US$154.1 billion, which would later result in the disintegration of the entire 
bloc.80 This was one of the direct causes of the collapse of the Eastern Europe economies. And, 
revolutions in Easter Europe also erupted in the same year. Starting from Lithuania and Latvia, 
one by one the countries in the bloc declared independence and the Soviet Government had no 
power or authority to stop them.81   
 
 
Fall of the Soviet Empire  
 
New leadership led by President Gorbachev was perceived to be too weak to rescue the country’s 
economy from disaster and to restore law and order. The straw that broke the camel’s back was 
the failed coup launched in an attempt to overthrow Gorbachev’s government in August 1991.82 
The mounting social unrest and the disintegration of the Soviet Union that followed made 
Gorbachev unable to preserve the Union either by force or by soft power. The Soviet empire was 
then dissolved and Gorbachev was forced to step down from its helm.  
 
 
 
 
IV. Failure to accumulate a strong fiscal reserve and pursue economy 
diversification  
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The Soviet Government could have reserved the course of events if it has been able to grasp the 
golden opportunity to build up stronger fiscal reserves in hard currency and reform the economy 
before it was too late.  
 
 
Fiscal reserves 
 
When the oil revenue was growing by leaps and bounds, the Soviet leadership failed to seize the 
day to build up hard currency reserves or expand its economic base. It did not see the importance 
of investing its export income in liquid financial instruments to be used in the event of an oil market 
downturn. It lacked the forward-thinking insight to establish stabilization policies with revenues 
set aside to counteract the decline in oil revenue.83 The Soviet leadership simply counted on high 
oil prices to support growth without clear anticipation of what would happen if prices slid back.84  
 
 
Economic reform  
 
Commodity-rich countries have a tendency to enjoy an economic boom when oil wealth is on the 
upside. However, the high dependence on oil exports in its GDP also meant that there would be 
little left to sustain its economy when oil revenue diminished. When the decline of oil 
prices caused hard currency revenue to dwindle, the obvious way of turning around the problem 
would have been to change economic structures in order to maintain strong fiscal reserves. 
This could have been achieved by reducing reliance on oil exports, expanding the economy’s base 
and increasing its self-sustainability in agricultural production by reforming the agricultural system. 
However, the Soviet Government’s biggest blunder was its failure to reform and diversify the 
economy before and after the oil price crash in a timely and efficient manner.   
 
 
Before the regime collapse, the then President Gorbachev had introduced economic reforms of 
perestroika (“restructuring”). Perestroika called for de-monopolization with a certain amount of 
semi-private businesses, plus the ending of price controls maintained by the government for the 
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past seven decades85. Unfortunately, such an economy would take time to evolve, and people 
had no patience to wait any longer, which led to long-lines, strikes, and civil unrest. 
 
 
Attempts to diversify the economy by boosting the manufactured industry products were 
thwarted by insufficient external demand, Soviet non-price competitiveness and unsuccessful 
reforms in industrialization.86 The absence of a market mechanism made industrial production 
inefficient, with each final product costing 1.6 to 7.6 times greater than similar products made in 
the United States in the 1980s.87 The substandard quality of Soviet goods also meant that Soviet 
industry was unable to sell any manufactured products overseas. 88   
 
 
In the midst of the fiscal reserves crisis, the Soviet Union hit a much larger stumbling block on the 
pathway to economic reform. It was left with no choice but to postpone numerous industrial reform 
projects slated for the five-year planning period from 1986 to 1990, which had been proposed by 
Gorbachev in the hope of freeing the Soviet country from the oil-curse entrapment.89 Unsuccessful 
economic diversification further undermined the ability of the Soviet Union to withstand the oil 
shock. 
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Venezuela  
 
Since oil exploration began there in the early 20th century, Venezuela’s economy has been heavily 
dependent on the petroleum industry. With the enormous proceeds from oil sales, Venezuela 
emerged as the richest country in Latin America and one of the top twenty richest countries in the 
world by 1970.90 Oil revenue trickled down to the country’s citizens who were happy to enjoy the 
economic fruits. With a lucrative oil income to fund the Government, Venezuela spent generously 
on social entitlements and welfare to smooth the democratic political system and ensure political 
stability.91 The country became more politically stable than its neighboring countries which were 
often plagued by leftist guerilla or rightist military authoritarianism from the 1960s to the 1980s.92 
Nevertheless, the fortune of Venezuela was reversed when the oil price crashed in 1985. The 
following section attempts to show that the 1985 oil price slump destabilized the domestic 
economy and undermined social stability, causing economic recession, hyperinflation, 
drastic currency depreciation and an extreme increase in external debt as well as the unemployment 
rate.  As the economy became increasingly unstable, the political environment turned turbulent as 
a result.  
 
 
In what follows we will demonstrate the importance of two factors: 1) insufficient fiscal reserves 
and 2) failure in economic reforms. The former brought about foreign debt default together with 
welfare and subsidy cuts which threatened the basic living standard of Venezuelans. The latter 
aggravated its ailing economy with an over-reliance on oil revenue without seeking diversification 
in and expansion of its economic structure.   
 
 
I. Oil revenue: the lifeblood of Venezuela  
 
 
Thanks to the natural asset of oil, oil exports accounted for 80% to 90% of the total exports of 
Venezuela from the 1970s to the 1980s.93  Venezuela’s balance of trade predominately relied on 
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oil and petroleum exports which became the major source of foreign currency. Oil 
industry contributed 20% to 25% of the total GDP of Venezuela. Its revenue propped up nearly all 
the Venezuelan economy94 and generated more than 70% of government revenue in the 1980s. 
The Venezuelan Government could not properly function without its crucial oil income. 
 
 
Though the country’s economy was heavily oil-dependent, the Venezuelan Government was able 
to put oil rents to good use from the 1950s to the 1970s.95  The Government was willing to invest 
in public infrastructure such as highways, seaports, electricity plants. Utility industries saw an 
average growth rate of 18.1% in the 1950s.96  Oil rent enabled the country to urbanize society with 
its rural population dropping from 80% in 1926 to 36% in 1970.97 Whenever oil prices soared from 
1957 to 1973, the Venezuelan government would increase spending on welfare and social benefits. 
For instance, the average enrollment in primary, secondary and tertiary schools increased 6.4%, 
14.2% and 18.2% respectively in the same period of time.98 
 
 
II. Economic consequence of the oil price crash 
 
 
The oil price decline of 1985 caught Venezuela by surprise. According to the then Planning 
Minister, Venezuela’s oil exports per capita dropped from US$1,700 in 1981 to US$500 in 1989, 
a slide of over 75%.99  Its total oil exports dived from a peak of US$45.3 billion in 1980 to a mere 
US$10 billion in 1986. The nation’s revenue fall took a heavy toll on the economy. Venezuela’s 
GDP per capita experienced a negative growth in the 1980s, reaching -10.8% in 1989. The country 
fell from a sharp peak into a deep trough, becoming the most under-performing country in Latin 
America.100  
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The first dire consequence brought by the price crash was the drastic devaluation of the 
Venezuelan currency.  Between 1983 and 1989, Venezuelan currency depreciated as much as two-
third against U.S. dollar.101 Venezuelans suffered as their currency lost the purchasing power to 
pay for imports. The ills of Venezuela became so evident after the oil price plummeted at the end of 
1985. Despite the government’s efforts to stabilize the economy by running a deficit budget of 
7.6% for three consecutive years 102  and tightening protectionist policies, 103  the Venezuelan 
economy was in deep crisis by the end of 1980s.104 Unemployment shot up to 10% in 1989105 
and per capita incomes dropped to where they had been in 1973.106 The economy was in terrible 
shape with much of the population living below the poverty line.107  
 
 
In 1989, Venezuelan current account deficit (net capital loss to international market) reached 9.9% 
of GDP and net fiscal reserves (fiscal reserves minus foreign debt) were at minus US$6.2 billion.108 
More importantly, domestic debt to GDP ratio emerged to a high level of around 90% and the 
government spent over half of its expenditure on debt repayments.109 In view of these statistics, 
Venezuela was on the verge of bankruptcy as it had great difficulty honouring its debt with 
domestic and international creditors. 
 
 
To make matter worse, Venezuela’s public sectors increased borrowing from the international loan 
markets even during good years. Between 1973 and 1981, the public sectors’ foreign debt grew 
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from 7.7% to 14.4% of total GDP.110 The domestic debt to GDP ratio steadily increased from 40% 
in 1979 to 64% in 1984.111 Therefore, Venezuela’s debt crisis was further exacerbated by the 
serious external debt accumulated from the good years.  
 
 
In view of the rising debt problem, a banking crisis erupted between 1988 and 1989.  Driven by 
fear of a bank run, depositors flocked to banks to draw money, forcing bank deposits to keep falling 
in mid-1987.112 At the end of 1988 and 1989, the drop in bank deposits by 40% started to bite into 
bank capital, forcing the banks to recall loans to fulfill the deposit withdrawal obligation and to 
avoid a bank run.113 As a result, bank loans to the private sectors in Venezuela dropped by 
almost 50% in the period, seriously hampering the private sector’s ability to refinance. 114  
The collapse of private credit did not recover until the late 1990s.115 
 
 
To prevent hyperinflation and the ensuing social disruption, the Government decided to install 
a complex price control mechanism with prices of daily necessity set at a rigid standard. Almost 
everything was priced by the Government, ranging from ice and coffee to funerals.116Meanwhile, 
shopkeepers felt little trust in the Government and feared further currency devaluation and the 
possibility of soaring inflation. They chose to stockpile merchandising and daily products, causing 
serious shortages of daily necessities.117 Despite efforts to control pricing, the inflation rate was at 
a high point of 30%.118 
 
 
The Manufacturing sector, which had been supported by state investment, also suffered a big hit.  
After oil price crash and a sharp decline in government oil revenue, the Venezuelan government 
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sharply cut public investment in manufacturing industries. As a direct result, real investment in 
manufacturing in Venezuela diminished by half between 1982 and 1986, from around 200 billion 
Venezuelan Bolivar to 100 billion in Bolivar.119 Many state-owned-enterprises were shut down 
due to inadequate financial support from the Government. The collapse of the manufacturing 
sectors contributed to bad debts, rising unemployment and the shortage of daily necessities.   \ 
 
 
III. Political instability: an inevitable result 
 
 
The economic crisis triggered by the oil price crash eroded public support for the elitist democratic 
system in Venezuela as it failed to deliver the desired economic results. Under dire 
economic circumstances, many citizens grew to resent the system and blamed the corruption of 
the elite class, believing that the state system had been captured by politicians and their sponsors 
who did not represent the interests of the people.120  Venezuela became increasingly political 
unstable. 
 
 
Riots erupted in 1989 
 
All along Venezuela’s elite politicians and the ruling party maintained political stability across 
the country by dint of a client system.121 In the good old days of high oil prices, politicians 
would distribute oil rents with their support base to secure and solidify the loyalty of their 
supporters. In practice, since oil wealth was mainly distributed through state-owned enterprises. 
The client group would benefit by being on the board of directors of the enterprises. Statistics 
showed that the composition of the board of directors covered different client sectors from 1960s 
to 1980s.122  
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The growth of oil revenue fuelled economic growth and supported state-owned manufacturers, 
who in return contributed better welfare and numerous job opportunities to the client sectors.123  
With sufficient oil revenues, the Government and elite politicians found it relatively easy to gain 
support for the two major political parties dominating the political system of the country.   
 
 
When the oil price crashed, the client system could not be sustained. Politicians no longer 
had enough oil money to solidify public support. They were compelled to cut government 
expenditure and close down unprofitable state-owned factories, which later agitated the masses of 
the unemployed. The political system was thrown into a tailspin.  
 
 
In 1989, a presidential election took place amidst the deep economic crisis. In order to pacify the 
public and reverse economy decline, the victorious Presidential candidate Carlos Andre Pérez 
had made many election promises and vowed to save the economy.124 However, his promises 
became empty ones even though he did launch a programme of reform to cut back on spending 
and strengthened the society’s safety net for the poor. But undoing a petro-state was difficult.125 
The austerity policies enacted shortly after he was sworn into the office 
triggered widespread discontent among the public. Voters felt deceived and lost faith in Pérez 
presidency and in the elitist democratic system.126  
 
 
Mounting social unrest ensued one month after Pérez ascended to the presidency. In view of the 
serious government deficit crisis, Pérez announced a doubling gasoline consumer price and cut its 
government subsidy. Public transport operators increased their fares by 30% while some drivers 
even demanded higher fares from commuters.127 The increase in transport fares led to one of the 
most deadly and serious riots in Venezuelan history. Citizens, including thousands of students, 
took to the streets of the capital Caracas and protests exploded, accompanied by looting and violent 
attacks. The Government finally clamped down on the protests, resulting in a death toll of 350 
with many injured.128   
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Continued political instability 
 
Venezuela continued to be politically unstable after the deadly riot was suppressed.  
The aftermath was severe with public outrage steadily growing, which eventually led to the change 
in Head of State. Partly because of public sympathy towards the protesters and rising resentment 
of the Government, legislative councilors cooperated less with the Government. Many even left 
their party, formed their own parliamentary bloc and openly criticized the Government.129 The 
traditional political parties, interest groups and those who benefited from the special distribution 
of rent united to oppose President Pérez.130 Because of the deep unpopularity of President Pérez, 
even the ruling party Acción Democrática vote for his impeachment on corruption charge.131 
 
 
Further political turmoil ensued. In the wake of the decline of the government, military officers 
took advantage and began to contemplate a Coup d'état. In 1992, military officer 
Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías launched two coups in an attempt to overthrow the Government.  
Though the coup attempts were thwarted in the end, they attracted widespread public sympathy.132 
Therefore, Chávez became a credible political alternative choice and paved the way for his election 
as president in 1998.133 
 
 
IV. Root cause of instability 
 
 
Inadequate fiscal reserves 
 
Venezuela suffered a hard knock during the 1985 oil price crash because it did not have adequate 
fiscal reserves. The country did not make good use of the sudden windfall of oil revenue in 1970s. 
In that period, Venezuelan enjoyed a windfall of additional government revenue valued at 523% 
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of 1973 GDP of the country.134  Instead of saving the money for use during future crisis, the 
Venezuelan Government wasted the money on inefficient state-owned enterprises.  Therefore, it 
was ill prepared for oil revenue dropping in 1985 oil price crash. 
 
 
Moreover, Venezuelan Government’s preparation for future crisis was inadequate. In 1974, 
Venezuelan Government set up a sovereign fund intended to offset future oil price shocks, namely 
the Venezuelan Investment Fund. However, instead of investing in overseas assets to hedge against 
a future domestic economic crisis, the Fund heavily invested in the already-overheated Venezuelan 
economy and became a major shareholder of many inefficient public firms.135 As a result, it lost 
the function of providing foreign capital to rescue domestic economies during times of crisis. If 
Venezuela had maintained a sizable foreign reserve, its economy would have been in better shape 
and it may well avoided political instability. 
 
 
Lastly, the lack of reserve also forced the government to print money to finance itself, 
which caused rampant inflation. From 1986 to 1988, the Venezuelan government ran on a deficit 
budget of over 5%.136 As the government could not borrow more external debt, it resorted to 
printing money to finance the deficit. Printing money caused inflation as money supply was 
artificially increased. Therefore, if Venezuela had had more fiscal reserves, its inflation problem 
would have been a lot better. 
 
 
Failed economic reform 
 
The impact of the oil price crash was also magnified by the failure of economic reform in 
Venezuela. The Venezuela government attempted to diversify and industrialize its economy 
through the creation of state-owned enterprises that focused on substituting imports. However, the 
state-owned enterprises were inefficient and wasted considerable oil rents. To discourage imports 
and to protect its inefficient industries, Venezuela further enacted severe regulations 
and erected substantial import barriers in the 1950s.  These measures eroded the competitiveness 
of the private sector in Venezuela. 
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The efficiency of public investment in Venezuela was hampered by the political 
system characterized by the domination of the elites in two political parties. 137 The two parties 
bought support from its nationals through the client system of rent distribution.  
Politician corruption was not checked as the two major parties had overwhelming influence over 
the bureaucracy, law enforcement and the judiciary. 138  As a result, politicians were corrupt 
and major decisions were made through behind-the-scene negotiations.139 President Pérez, who 
ruled Venezuela between 1974 and 1979, was known to issue contracts to his favorite contacts in 
the construction sector. 140   Many state-owned enterprises were inefficient and investment 
decisions were based on political factors rather than economic factors. Therefore, state-
owned enterprises in Venezuela were not efficient and could not compete internationally. 
 
 
Government played the most important role in the industrialization of Venezuela. The GDP share 
of non-oil state-own enterprises increased from 3.2% in 1970 to 7.2% in 1982.141 Public sector 
spending also ballooned from 15.4% of GDP in 1973 to 30.3% in 1980.142  Public investment 
steadily increased from 24% of all investment in 1970 to 67% in 1982. Nevertheless, the state-
owned enterprises were inefficient and they could not develop into sustainable and healthy 
industries. And, they relied on continued state support. During the oil price crash, 
manufacturing collapsed as the government was forced to cut its subsidies to state-
owned enterprise and they could not survive. 
 
 
Because of the faulty development strategy, Venezuela failed to diversify and continued to rely on 
oil revenue as the main stay of its economy. Therefore, its economy suffered a lethal blow when 
oil revenue declined sharply. 
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Algeria 
 
With its first major discovery of black gold in the 1950s, oil eventually became the engine of the 
Algerian economy. The tremendous oil revenues enabled the Algerian government to fuel its 
economic development initiatives and fund an extensive state-supported welfare system, 
especially food subsidies. The redistribution of proceeds from oil export to its people had also 
allowed the Algerian government to be free of political accountability until the mid-1980s. 
However, Algeria experienced a “Dark Decade” in the 1990s with an estimated death toll of 
200,000. The source of this violent conflict can be traced back to the mid-1980s when oil 
prices crashed. The deep decline in oil prices started from 1985 exposed the various inefficiencies 
in economic reforms and the heavy reliance on oil revenue in Algeria. The oil price crash greatly 
decreased oil export receipts, seriously drained Algeria’s fiscal reserves and affected its ability to 
finance its development investment, continue its welfare programme and pay its debts. There was 
a sharp decline in living standards and a dramatic rise in unemployment. The refusal of help from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the decision to cut public spending further generated 
widespread anger among Algerians which erupted into a week-long uprising and riots in October 
1988. The violence brought about constitutional reform (i.e. put an end to one-party rule) and the 
onset of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. 
 
 
This section will demonstrate why the fall in oil prices in 1985 was a major and undeniable cause 
of Algeria’s violent conflicts and the onset of the Algerian civil war. It will first set out the 
importance of oil revenues to the economy of Algeria. It will then establish the link between the 
sharp fall in oil prices, the failing economy and social instability in Algeria. The sharp drop in oil 
revenue triggered a recession, hyperinflation and high unemployment in Algeria. It also 
depleted Algeria’s fiscal reserves. The Algerian government was at the brink of bankruptcy 
and was unable to repay its debts and continue its food subsidies and other welfare. The tottering 
economy finally led to the introduction of an austerity policy, with riots in 1988 and the onset 
of civil war in the 1990s as direct results. 
 
 
In the case of Algeria, two critical factors contributed to political instability during the period of 
oil prices crash: 1) insufficient fiscal reserves to support the government in dealing with the 
economic crisis and maintaining social security programmes. The dire financial situation of the 
government led to the introduction of an austerity policy which drastically affected the basic living 
standards in Algeria. And 2) incapability of the Algerian government to carry out effective 
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and timely economic reform to diversify its oil-dependent economy and offset the impact of 
dramatic oil prices fluctuations. 
 
 
I. Oil Revenues: the lifeblood of Algeria 
 
 
Before the discovery of oil in the 1950s, Algeria’s economy was largely based on agriculture. With 
the oil discovery in the late 1950s and Algeria’s independence in 1962, the oil industry had become 
the engine and backbone of Algeria’s economy. The dramatic increase in oil revenues in 1960s 
and 1970s had shifted the government’s development focus to the oil industry. With the substantial 
oil revenue, extensive industrialization had taken place during the period.  
It had transformed the economy of Algeria, making it one of the wealthiest nations in Africa.143 
Until the early 1980s, the economic growth indicators of Algeria were impressive. The average 
GDP growth rate between 1965 and 1980 was 7.5%, the highest among oil-exporting 
developing countries.144 
 
 
In the 1980s, oil still dominated the economy of Algeria. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 145  Algeria estimated oil reserves of 8.1 – 9.4 billion barrels in the 
1980146and its oil fields produced high-quality light crude oil with very low sulfur content.147 
Being the largest oil producing country in Africa, oil export revenue accounted for 95% of 
the country’s total export in the 1980s, up from less than 50% in the 1960s.148 Oil revenues 
also contributed to 38% and 25.8% of Algeria’s GDP in 1975 and 1985 respectively.149 These 
figures demonstrated that Algeria’s economy was heavily relied on oil revenues.  
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Moreover, oil revenues had also become the major source of funding of the government budget. 
In 1985, the oil revenue accounted for 58% of government income, up from 31% in the early 
1970s.150 With the substantial oil revenue during oil price boom in the 1970s and the optimistic 
forecast for future oil prices, the government was able to promote its centrally planned economic 
initiatives (i.e. industrialization) funded by oil revenue and international loans. 151  The 
industrialization had encouraged rural-urban migration, leading to a growth of urban population 
from 30% in early 1960s to 50% in 1988.152 
 
 
II. Economic consequence of the oil prices crash 
 
 
Oil prices collapsed since November 1985, falling from their previous height of around US$30 per 
barrel at the beginning of the decade to a low of below US$10 per barrel for a few months in 1986. 
As a result, the oil revenues of Algeria declined by more than 50%. The export earnings from the 
oil sector fell from the peak of US$14.2 billion in 1981 to US$7.3 billion in 1986.153 This oil price 
plunge led to a series of economic consequences for Algeria. 
 
 
Firstly, the steep drop in revenue had a huge impact on Algeria’s economy given that 25% of its 
GDP was contributed by the oil industry. Algeria had entered into recession with its GDP growth 
rate decreasing from 5.6% growth in 1985 to -0.2% in 1986, and it fell further to -1.9% in 1988. 
Per capita gross national product (GNP) had also declined by roughly 2.5% annually, from a high 
of US$1,789 in 1985 to a low of US$1,370 in 1994, a drop of 24% in nine years.154 With such 
substantial decrease in per capita GNP, the purchasing power, and thus the living standards of 
Algerians had decreased sharply. Moreover, since the majority of enterprises were stated owned, 
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the decrease in oil revenues implied that the investment in these enterprises would decrease. The 
unemployment rate thus rose from 16% in 1983 to 23.6% in 1989 and 30% in the 1990s.155 
 
 
Secondly, the steep decline in oil revenues had worsened the debt problem of Algeria. Algeria was 
already heavily in debt in 1985 due to loans for industrial reform in the 1970s and early 1980s. It 
became further indebted (by getting more international loans) in order to compensate for the falling 
oil revenues.156 The ratio of external debt to GDP thus rose from 31% in 1985 to 42% in 1988. 
The debt service ratio also rose from 33% in 1982 to 68% in 1986 and 86% in 1988.157 Moreover, 
the diner158 had depreciated from 5.03 dinar to one U.S. dollar in 1985, to double value in 1990, 
and gone even further to 22.50 dinar to one U.S. dollar in 1992. This currency deflation 
had multiplied the weight of the debt. All these had brought Algeria to the brink of bankruptcy. 
 
 
Thirdly, the sharp drop in oil revenue had exacerbated the fiscal deficit of the Algerian government 
and drained Algeria’s fiscal reserves. The government was in substantial fiscal deficit before 1985 
due to its lending to state-owned enterprises. This fiscal weakness was exacerbated when oil prices 
were slashed. In order to maintain their operation, the Algerian government had to tap, and thus 
drained its fiscal reserves. The fiscal reserves of Algeria decreased from US$ 4.65 billion in 1985 
to US$ 2.7 billion in 1990.159 
 
 
Fourthly, the crisis eroded the government’s welfare capacity, and seriously affected the basic 
living standards of Algerians. While Algeria’s agriculture was unable to meet domestic needs, the 
Algerian government had to import food to meet the deficit. Food imports and food subsidies 
amounted to US$2.2 billion in 1986, which was 20% of total oil revenue. In view of the falling oil 
revenue, the Algerian government had to reduce food imports and food subsidies in 1988. The 
reduction in food subsidies had led to increases in food prices of 40% between January and October 
1988. 160 There was also massive shortage of essential goods due to cut in imports. Poverty grew 
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significantly between 1987 and 1995, when 22.6% of the population was living below the poverty 
line.161 The basic living standard of many Algerians had been seriously affected as a result. 
 
 
III. Political instability an inevitable result 
 
 
The high oil prices and tremendous oil receipts of the 1970s had allowed President Houari 
Boumediene, who ruled the country from 1965 until 1978, to finance an extensive state-
supported welfare system, allowing him to be free from popular political accountability. The steep 
drop in oil revenue due to 1985 oil price crash had undermined the government’s ability to provide 
services and subsidize important staples. While Algeria was on the brink of bankruptcy, President 
Chadli Bendjedid (successor of President Boumediene, and ruled Algeria from 1979 until 1992) 
refused to default on the country’s debts. Instead, he introduced a drastic austerity policy which 
included radical reductions in subsidies for staple foods, the lifting of price controls, the 
downsizing of welfare programmes, and a cut in import.162 It had resulted in a calamitous fall in 
the Algerians’ purchasing power and negative reactions from the Algerians.163   Furthermore, 
inflationary pressures as a result of dinar devaluation and the rising price in food imports 
aggravated the overall economy and purchasing power of the population. The already 
worsened basic living standards fell further. 
 
 
Riots in 1988 
 
The austerity policy introduced by President Bendjedid in 1986, together with economic malaise, 
food shortages and high unemployment, had generated widespread anger among Algerians. This 
had eventually erupted into a week-long uprising and riots which started on October 5, 1988 and 
ended on October 11, resulting in about 500 deaths and 1,000 wounded.164 Although the riots were 
cracked down by the military, the frustration of Algerians had deepened. The government thus had 
to initiate substantive political reforms. A new constitution was introduced in 1989 which 
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allowed the formation of political parties other than the single ruling party, National Liberation 
Front (FLN), for competition. The new constitution allowed other political parties to compete 
freely in municipal and parliamentary elections. Approximately 50 parties were created under the 
new constitution. Among these parties, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the most successful 
and won more than half of all votes cast in municipal elections in June 1990, while the FLN only 
obtained 34% of the vote. 165  The ruling FLN was losing its control over the state. The 
new constitution ended the one-party rule in Algeria, present since independence, and laid the 
foundations for the subsequent violent conflict. 
 
 
Onset of Algerian Civil War in 1990s 
 
As the popularity of FIS increased, the political atmosphere became increasingly tense among FLN 
and FIS. The ruling party, FLN introduced repressive measures to maintain its power. However, 
such repressive measures increased the popularity of the opposing FIS even further. Moreover, the 
FIS made use of the widespread discontent and distrust of the governing FLN to broaden its support 
base.166 Another conflict began in December 1991 when the FIS was expected to take over the 
ruling role of FLN in the national parliamentary elections by winning 188 out of 231 seats in the 
first round of parliamentary elections. The second round of elections was scheduled for mid-
January of 1992. Fearing that FIS would really dominate parliament, the military stepped in, which 
forced President Bendjedid to resign, took control of the government, cancelled the 
second round of parliamentary election and proclaimed a state of emergency. Afterwards, 
violent conflicts between various Islamic groups and the military started and became a civil war 
which only ended in 1998 with an estimated death toll of 200,000.167 
 
 
IV. Root causes of instability  
 
 
As demonstrated in previous sections, the slash in oil prices had led to economic malaise 
and then caused political instability in Algeria. There were two root causes that contributed to the 
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political instability during the period of the oil prices crash, namely failed economic reform 
and inadequate fiscal reserves. 
 
 
Failed economic reform 
 
The first root cause of political instability was the inability of the Algerian government to carry 
out effective and timely economic reforms to diversify its oil-dependent economy and offset the 
impact of oil prices crash. 
 
 
The heavy reliance on oil revenues has distorted the structure of the Algerian economy. Industries 
other than the hydrocarbons industry were underdeveloped. This can be seen from the large 
decrease in components of normal taxes (i.e. taxes other than those form the oil sector) from 58% 
in early 1970s to 34.2% in 1980.168 Having regard to this, the government carried out economic 
reforms with a view to diversifying its economy during the 1970s and early 1980s. The reform 
focused almost entirely on developing the industrial sector and relied on oil exports to support its 
development. The domestic industry, especially the agricultural sector, was neglected during the 
economic reform.  
 
 
The industrialization had been aimed at generating employment and enhancing the development 
of the wider economy.169 During the high oil prices of the 1970s, instead of saving the oil receipts, 
a considerable amount of the oil revenue (as much as 80%) was invested in the industrialization 
programme. Among these investments, 90% was channeled to the public sector and primarily 
to capital-intensive industrial projects.170 Nonetheless, Algeria had made slight progress in its 
diversification drive. Many of these industrialization projects were poorly designed. The stated-
owned enterprises were oversized and inefficient. The undiversified economy of Algeria was thus 
unable to offset the impact of oil price crash in 1985 to 1986. Furthermore, instead of successfully 
diversifying the economy of Algeria, the above initiatives brought two heavy burdens to Algeria. 
Firstly, it incurred substantial debts. The total debt of Algeria increased from US$ 1 billion to 
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US$19.3 billion between 1970 and 1980 171 and these foreign debts began to fall due in the mid-
1980s. 172  Secondly, the agriculture sector had been neglected, leading to more reliance on 
food imports and food subsidies. According to Aouragh (as cited in Shabafrouz, 2010173), domestic 
agricultural production was able to meet 70% of Algeria’s needs in 1969. The figure 
dropped to 50% of in 1982 and to only 20% in 1987. To cover production shortfalls, the 
government has had to import staple foods and other basic commodities at significantly higher 
prices, and provide them at low, subsidized consumer prices to its citizens using oil revenue. The 
import costs amounted to US$2.2 billion in 1986, which was 20% of the total net receipts from oil. 
174  
 
 
Because of the faulty development strategy, Algeria could not diversify its economy 
and continued to rely on oil revenues as the main driver of its economy. The above together 
resulted in Algeria becoming significantly indebted, despite its high oil revenue, 
and accelerated the economic crisis during the oil price crash in 1985 and 1986. 
 
 
Inadequate fiscal reserves 
 
The second root cause was the inadequate fiscal reserves available to support the government in 
dealing with the economic crisis and maintaining social security. During the high oil prices in 
1970s, instead of saving the oil receipts, a considerable amount of the oil revenue (as much as 80%) 
was invested in the industrialization programme and no savings were left from the oil revenue.175 
The fiscal reserve in 1985 was just US$4.65 billion.176 Moreover, Algerian government engaged in 
heavy foreign borrowing to finance its infrastructure projects. In 1980, its foreign debt grew to 
US$16.9 billion. During the oil prices crash in 1985 and 1986, the situation worsened. The debt to 
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service ration increased more than double from 35% in 1985 to 80% in 1988.177 The Algerian 
government was unable to sustain the debt repayment and had to introduce austerity policies which 
drastically affected the basic living standard of Algerians. 
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Saudi Arabia 
 
Thanks to the massive crude oil reserves of around 170 billion barrels in 1980s,178 the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia became the largest oil exporter with the economy mainly reliant on oil sales. 
Regardless of the fluctuations in oil prices, its export of crude oil and petroleum products had never 
been dropped below 90% between 1973 and 1985.179 At the same time, oil and gas sales also 
accounted for more than two-third of the Kingdom’s GDP.180 
 
 
Despite the similarity between Saudi Arabia and the other three petro-states in terms of economic 
reliance on oil exports, Saudi Arabia is the country that was able to survive the 1985 oil price 
shock. The oil price dip did not bring about economic turmoil in Saudi Arabia as massive 
and turbulent as that in the other three petro-states. The economic setback there did not shake the 
foundations of society or cause any political instability that could result in a change of the head of 
state, widespread social unrest, military coups, civil wars or even the collapse of the Kingdom, 
unlike the other three case studies.  
 
 
The absence of political instability in Saudi Arabia during the 1985 oil price crash does not refute 
our theory of oil price shock leading to political instability. On the contrary, it has affirmed our 
theory: size does matter. Abundance of fiscal reserves saved the Kingdom from the oil price dip, 
a factor missing in the other three cases in the bygone era of the late 1980s. 
 
 
In the following section, we will first elaborate the importance of oil revenues to the survival of 
the Kingdom. After that it will analyse the relatively mild economic hardship triggered by the 
falling oil price in Saudi Arabia. It will then explain why the Saudi Arabia could avoid falling prey 
to political instability by highlighting the importance of an indispensable factor that set Saudi 
Arabia apart from the others: enormous fiscal reserves. It was the huge amount of reserves that 
saved the country from economic as well as political turmoil.  
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I. Oil revenues: the lifeblood of the Kingdom 
 
 
Similar to the other three petro-states, oil wealth was all along the lifeblood of Saudi Arabia. As 
an oil-dependent country, Saudi Arabia benefitted hugely from the oil price surge as a result of 
OPEC’s oil embargo and other factors in the 1970s to the early 1980s. The immense oil production 
power enabled Saudi Arabia to rise to the stage of one of the fast-growing economies in the world. 
The Kingdom reached its economic peak with cumulative oil revenues of SR$1374.6 billion 
between 1974 and 1981, almost twentyfold when compared to that of the pre-oil boom years from 
1970 to 1973.181   
 
 
The drastic increase in oil wealth led to a surge in Saudi Arabia’s GDP (billions of U.S. dollars). 
From the pre-oil boom year in 1970 to the golden year of 1981, Saudi’s GDP increased almost 
thirty-five-fold from SR$24.21 billion (US$5.38 billion) to SR$622 billion (US$184.29 billion).182 
Regardless of oil price fluctuations, the oil sector continued to dominate Saudi’s economy. Exports 
of crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 90% of the Kingdom’s total exports,183 65% of 
GDP184 and around 90% of total’s government revenue185 between the oil boom in the 1970s 
and 1985 oil price crash.  
 
 
Oil revenues thereby became the major source of income to fund Saudi government operations 
and goals. And, more importantly, it fueled extensive social welfare programmes for Saudis in 
order to maintain social stability and the parental relationship between the Saudi government 
and its people.  
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II. Absence of economic crisis during oil price crash  
 
 
The Kingdom’s over-dependence on oil revenue implied that any fluctuations in oil prices 
would have an immediate impact on the Kingdom’s revenue. When oil prices began to drop in 
November 1985, Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues saw a drastic slump, more than three-fold. The 
Kingdom’s oil money swiftly dropped from its peak of SR$1374.6 billion between 1974 and 1981, 
to SR$540.3 billion between 1982 and 1985, and fell further to SR$478.3 billion between 1986 
and 1991.186 As oil revenues are closely associated with GDP; Saudi Arabia’s GDP (billions of 
U.S. dollars), therefore, fluctuated dramatically according to oil prices. Between 1981 and 1987, 
the Kingdom’s GDP (billions of U.S. dollars) plummeted more than a double, form the peak of 
SR$622 billion (US$184.29 billion) to SR$321 billion (US$$85.7).187 
 
 
Though Saudi Arabia encountered tremendous drops in oil revenues, the Kingdom did not 
experience an economic crisis as critical as it was in the Soviet Union, Venezuela and Algeria. It 
did not have to seek financial support from international banks and financial institutions to support 
the government spending. Instead, it exercised various financial means to obtain money 
and thus cover debts and to maintain the Kingdom’s economic operations. Saudi government kept 
its debts entirely domestic and did not seek help from any international monetary organizations 
like Algeria, which was later compelled to undergo various reforms in order to secure international 
loans.188 
 
 
Financial means played by the Saudi government included but were not limited to the selling of 
government debt to domestic banks, 189  and the selling of government bonds to state-
owned pension funds. In Saudi Arabia, around 75% to 80% of government debt is held by two 
government pension funds and only less than 20% is held by commercial banks, private companies 
and individuals.190 Therefore, unlike the Soviet Union, Venezuela and Algeria that had to deal with 
the foreign debt problems and were forced to implement unpopular economic reforms 
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demanded by the international financial institutions and banks, the Saudi government, by way 
of contrast, owed most of its debts to itself and kept debt problems entirely domestic through the 
manipulation of funds.191 Without seeking help from international financial institutions for loans, 
Saudi Arabia was not subject to any changes of economic policies demanded by these institutions 
and thus minimized the risk of introducing wrong policies at the wrong time. The Kingdom 
maintained financial independence and dealt with the global oil price recession at its own pace.  
 
 
Saudi Arabia also enjoyed a relatively stable currency rate without meeting inflationary pressure 
as intense as those in the Soviet Union. To maintain currency stability, it pegged the currency 
Saudi Riyal, to the U.S. dollar in 1986 at a fixed exchange rate of SR$1 to US$3.75. This 
immediate government policy in response to the oil price slash minimized currency speculation 
activity. It maintained currency stability and independent financial status, which enabled the 
Kingdom to minimize the negative impact of oil price slump and thus to stabilize the economy.  
 
 
III. Immense advantage: enormous fiscal reserves 
 
 
Devoid of economic downturn 
 
The main reason why Saudi Arabia could withstand the 1985 oil slump was the existence of an 
unparalleled advantage that was not seen in petro-states like the Soviet Union, Venezuela 
and Algeria: enormous fiscal reserve. Reserves in Saudi Arabia were massive enough to fend off 
economic recession and subsequent political turmoil. During the golden age of the oil boom from 
1974 to 1981, the Saudi government accumulated almost US$200 billion of foreign exchange 
reserves (including gold).192 Foreign exchange reserves held by Saudi Arabia was twice that of 
Venezuela and six-and-a-half-fold more than Algeria.193  
 
Due to the advantage of enormous fiscal reserves, the Saudi government had the ability to maintain 
deficit spending. King Fahd, the then King of Saudi Arabia, repeatedly promised to protect his 
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people from economic hardship194 and continued delivering extensive welfare to  the people. Even 
though Saudi oil revenues plummeted almost three-fold, from SR$1374.6 billion (1974-1981) to 
SR$478.3 billion (1986-1991);195 Saudi government expenditure fell by a much smaller amount. 
Government spending dropped just slightly by 16% from SR$121.7 billion in 1981 to SR$102.3 
billion in 1988.196 In 1991, the Saudi government even spent more than it actually spent in 1981, 
despite the fact that oil prices had dropped more than 60% between these years.  
 
 
Sufficient cash in hand also allowed Saudi Arabia to reduce the burden of oil price crash and it 
sustained a longer period of deficit spending during the 1985 oil bust and its aftermath. 197  
It allowed Saudi Arabia to maintain deficit spending, prevented economic recession 
and protected its people from suffering economic hardship. It also allowed the Kingdom to 
maintain its financial independence without interference in its domestic economic and monetary 
policies by international lenders.   
 
 
Ability to build strong reserves  
 
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia and the other three petro-states were all oil-dependent countries. What 
made Saudi Arabia stand out from its peers to store up strong fiscal reserves to keep the economy 
afloat and its society stable? All in all, it was the ability of Saudi Arabia to save money for a rainy 
day. Saudi Arabia was dubbed a “swing producer”. It was the world’s largest oil exporter 
and had spare production capacity to increase oil production at an extremely low cost.  Its oil 
production flexibility allowed the country to sway the global oil supply and therefore affect the 
price. Compared to oil states with smaller production scales and with higher production costs, 
which were not able or were unwilling to save oil revenue during oil boom years;198 it was much 
easier for Saudi Arabia to save excess oil revenues during oil boom years.199  
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IV. Political instability: not an inevitable result 
 
 
With the strong fiscal reserves on hand and a sound financial structure, the Saudi government 
did not have to drastically cut the government spending or to increase international borrowing as 
in the previous three cases. It could maintain a deficit budget for years by drawing on its reserves 
which helped the country sustain a solid social foundation by a continuous provision of welfare 
and hence political stability.200 Despite the drop in GDP, there was no shortage of imports, no 
surge in unemployment rates, no growing food crisis, and hence no appearance of significant social 
unrest as experienced by the other three petro-states. The entire Saudi population could survive the 
economic downturn after the slump of oil price without suffering from serious financial 
austerity.201 All in all, the oil price recession did not constitute a challenge to the Kingdom’s 
economic or political stability.202 
 
 
For years, the Saudi government was aware of the importance of economic diversification and gave 
it top priority in the long-term policy goals. In reality, given the massive availability of crude oil 
and oil revenues to fund Saudi’s government policies without seeking external resources, the Saudi 
government did not see any pressing need to introduce significant economic reforms. The 
Kingdom only resorted to limited expenditure cuts in infrastructure development, such as 
abandoning new plans for building oil refinery plants and international airports, to save money.203 
It did not seriously revamp its economy to alleviate its dependence on oil. However, strong fiscal 
reserves again could help the Kingdom to withstand crises in the oil price despite its continuous 
over-reliance on oil. 
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Indonesia 
 
In what follows, we will present the case of Indonesia to show how a country once heavily 
depended on oil revenues could survive the 1985 price shock and shift away from the development 
trajectory of oil dependence. Compared to the enormous foreign exchange reserves of US$200 
billion possessed by Saudi Arabia in 1981,204 foreign reserves held by Indonesia was slightly more 
than US$26 billion. 205  Despite relatively small reserve, Indonesia did not experience an 
economic crisis or political instability after the 1985 oil bust. It was not sheer luck but timely 
and effective economy reform that spared the country economic crisis and political turmoil in the 
wake of the oil price crash.  
 
 
I. Oil revenues: the lifeblood of Indonesia 
 
 
As a petro-state, Indonesia heavily relied on oil exports for economic survival. It saw growing 
expansion in the oil export industry from the 1970s to the early 1980s. In 1970, exports of crude 
oil, gas and related products only accounted for 33% of Indonesia’s total exports.206 Oil exports 
doubled and reached 70% in 1974 and 80% in 1979.207 From the pre-oil boom year of 1970 to 
1981, Indonesia’s GDP (billions of U.S. dollars) increased almost tenfold, from US$9.66 billion 
to US$92.47 billion. 208  Oil and gas revenues, taxes from oil companies and import duties 
accounted for over two-third of total revenue for the Indonesian government. Oil income became 
the main pillar in support of the country’s economy.209 Windfall profits from the oil boom led the 
government to overlook the role of foreign investment; hence it focused on inward-looking 
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policies210 to build the economy mainly in a few basic sectors: infrastructure, basic industries, 
agriculture and education.211 
 
 
Despite the heavy blow of oil price crash to petro-states in general, Indonesia did not follow in the 
footsteps of the Soviet Union, Venezuela and Algeria by introducing austerity measures or 
building up international debt to rescue a faltering economy. In contrast, it survived well and was 
able to maintain economic stability. The country saw a remarkable growth in GDP at an average 
rate of 6.73%.212 In 1991, the country’s GDP growth rate even reached 8.93%,213 which was more 
than double the growth of 1985. Economic stability came with political stability. Indonesia did not 
experience considerable social turmoil and dramatic political changes as in at least three other 
petro-states.  
 
 
II. Intense Economic reform  
 
 
The dominant factor that contributed to the stable economic growth of Indonesia was in its export 
policy beginning to depart from an over-reliance on oil. The Government was determined to 
insulate the country from the volatility of oil prices by embracing economic diversification.  
 
 
Indonesia has gone through a sea change in economic structure and started to embrace an export-
oriented policy since the 1980s.214 Way before the 1985 oil price crash, there was another oil price 
dip in 1982 arising from the sluggish global oil demand. Fall in state revenues served as a wake-
up call for Indonesia government to diversify its economy after suffering currency devaluation. 
The years of 1985 and 1987 marked a new chapter of economic diversification in Indonesia which 
began to lift protections on domestic industries, launch a host of new regulations to support 
investment, open the door to welcome foreign investment, improve trade facilitation and reduce 
bureaucratic inefficiencies. All in all the array of policies was able to unlock immense business 
opportunities in Indonesia’s non-oil sectors.  
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Significant policies included deregulation packages for industries like the automotive, machinery 
and electrical equipment, mining, agriculture and health. The government also discounted import 
duties for selected commodities, including textiles and steel. The country 
even created Bonded Zone through Government Regulation No. 22 in 1986 to encourage non-oil 
exports by giving tax and duty waivers to companies operating inside the zone.215 
 
 
The proactive relaxation of export-oriented policies also contributed greatly to higher 
diversification in manufacturing sectors. Concurrently, the manufacturing industry boom was 
promoted by the relocation of high-cost factories in Japan to Indonesia after 1985.216 Indonesia 
became one of the platforms for a footloose manufacturing industry.217 With a boom in textile 
and shoe factories, Indonesia's economy successfully diversified away from its oil dependence 
and continued to grow at a healthy clip of about 6% annually.218 
 
 
As a result, the oil export sector was no longer the growth engine to drive the country’s economic 
development as it was in the 1970s. Exports of crude oil, gas and related products decreased from 
their peak of 80% in 1979 to 65% in 1985 and further down to 33% in 1991.219 In 2004, Indonesia’s 
position shifted from being a net oil exporter to a net oil importer due to the rise in domestic 
energy consumption.220 
 
 
III. Crackdown of state-owned oil conglomerate  
 
 
Another contributing factor that accelerated the economic diversification in Indonesia hinged on 
the state-owned oil conglomerate - Pertamina. During the oil boom, Pertamina was so gigantic that 
even the Indonesian government lost its grip on this mega kingdom. It was dubbed “a state within 
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a state”. Pertamina enjoyed an expansion from oil exporter to other businesses activities, such as 
steel manufacturing.221 The vested interests owned by Pertamina became a stumbling block to the 
government in rolling out economic reform.  
 
 
The over-expansion of Pertamina accumulated huge international debt. As debt snowballed, 
Pertamina failed to repay its cumulative debt of US$10.5 billion in 1975, equivalent to almost 30% 
of the country’s GDP.222 The corporate  crisis of Pertamina provided a window for the then 
President Suharto to exert power on Pertamina and regain lost ground by reclaiming total control 
in this state-owned conglomerate.223 The subsequent reform of Pertamina led by the government 
gave the opportunity for the state to weed out the parties with vested interests and to launch its 
overall economic reform across the country in the mid-1980s.  
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Conclusion of Case Study 
 
The case study of the five petro-states have affirmed our theory: an oil price crash leads to 
economic demise and political downfall if the states are not processed of two essential elements: 
fiscal reserves strength and successful economic diversification.  
 
 
In the cases of the Soviet Union, Algeria and Venezuela, the common ailment was that they all 
seemingly experienced sudden large plunge in GPD after the oil price crash beginning in 
November 1985. They fell from peak to trough, being the richest or the most powerful country in 
the region before sliding to the bottom of the pile as the worst economy in their respective region 
after the price crash. With that came government budget deficiency, fiscal reserves depletion, 
budget cuts, welfare reduction, followed by considerable social and political turmoil within the 
seven years framework of the study.  
 
 
The three petro-states had a common perceived obligation to use oil money to placate and curry 
favour with their population and supporters in the good old days. Examples include the Soviet 
Union subsidizing the imports and food supply of their own citizens, Venezuela subsidizing 
transportation and Algeria for food imports. Excessive state subsidies in various formats for the 
petro-states to stabilize the society put them in a precarious position and they had to continue 
relying on oil revenues.224 Once these governments were committed to vast societal obligations, 
they could not easily rescind them without exposing themselves to the risk of exasperating the 
public. They were caught in a quandary between providing more aid to stabilize their societies or 
adopting austerity policies. To fuel their burgeoning budget deficits, they counted on ballooning 
domestic and international debts which eventually led to irreversible debt crises.  
 
 
The three nations ended up spiraling into economic demise with fiscal reserves quickly dissipated. 
Their power to maintain stability receded when oil prices dropped. Increasing food and daily 
necessities shortages coupled with inflation became the last straw threatening the daily life of the 
population. Widespread economic calamity finally pushed the regimes to the brink of collapse. All 
sorts of social unrest erupted including riots, civil wars, coups and, in the case of the Soviet Union, 
total regime change. Political instability was the inevitable consequence in the course of seven 
years.  
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Yet, not all the petro-states suffered from the same demise. Our case study of Saudi Arabia 
and Indonesia showed otherwise. These two countries emerged relatively unscathed amidst the 
1985 price drop. The conclusion reinforced our analysis: the existence of strong fiscal reserves 
and successful economic diversification bar a petro-state from falling into turmoil in times of oil 
price collapse. Saudi Arabia amassed US$200 billion in foreign exchange reserves which 
allowed the Kingdom to maintain deficit spending and extensive social spending to protect the 
people from economic hardship. It had the financial leeway to spend significantly on domestic 
welfare to quell critics.. Indonesia proactively diversified its economy from the 1980s by unlocking 
immense business opportunities in non-oil sectors. It enjoyed continued growth in GDP regardless 
of 1985 oil price crash.  
 
 
While in the case of the Soviet Union, Venezuela and Algeria, they did not accumulate fiscal 
reserves as strong as Saudi Arabia’s. When the tide of oil income turned, they did not have the 
financial strength to withstand the price volatility impact. Again, it was hard for these three petro-
states to diversify their economies when they once swam in oil. The entrenched vested interests of 
petro-state bureaucrats and resistance from the ruling class made each country difficult to transition 
away from oil dependence and stifled diverse economic development.225  Regardless of their 
attempts to reform, they ended up as failures. Their ineptitude to diversify their oil-dominant 
economies in a timely and effective manner led to their economic as well as political demise.  
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2014 oil price crash: back to the future?  
 
History is repeating itself. Petro-states of today are facing stunningly similar situations by and large 
reminiscent of the gloomy and doomed days from 1985 to 1992. In what follows, we will apply 
our theory to analyze the situation of today. 
 
 
Before the oil price crash beginning from the June 2014, the five petro-states in our study 
enjoyed abundant income, benefitting from rising oil revenue which flowed from 2005 to early 
2014. Easily accessible petro-dollars enriched petro-states immensely and gave them plenty of 
room to sustain economic development as well as massive social spending. In return, petro-states 
enjoyed the fruits of economic prosperity and experienced relative stability. Unfortunately the 
growth trajectory of these countries made a drastic “U-turn” as the oil price collapsed and oil 
revenue dried up.  The sudden event of the oil price crash punched a large hole in the pockets of 
the petro-states. It is reasonable to wonder whether the recent price crash will also make their 
economies go bust, topple their heads of state or even break up the entire petro-state.   
 
 
In what follows we will provide some thoughts for tomorrow. We will analyze through the prism 
of the theory of this paper and assess whether the 2014 oil price crash and the continuous low oil 
prices will engender some kind of economic demise in the five petro-states and push them even to 
the brink of political turmoil. The paper will conduct a comprehensive analysis of each petro-state 
to identify whether its fiscal reserve strength and economic diversification status can help each of 
them survive the price shock and ensure they remain intact for years to come. The events of today 
may be a grim reminder of the hard knocks the petro-states suffered thirty years ago.  
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Venezuela today: at the brink of collapse  
 
When we apply the theory to analyze today’s Venezuela, the country is doomed to be repeating 
the history. In many ways it bears cunning similarity with 1985 oil price crash. Venezuela fails in 
learning the lessons to diversify its economy and relies too much on oil revenues. The country is 
now suffering the worst economic crisis in its history. Austerity policies have exasperated the 
public that comes with looming political turmoil.  
 
 
Economic malaise in sight  
 
Instead of diversifying its economy away from oil, Venezuela becomes even more dependent on 
oil revenues today. Oil revenues account for about 95% of the country’s total export earnings 
(higher than 80% average in the 1980s),226 60% of the government revenues227 and 25% of GDP. 
When oil prices drop, the impact on its government revenues is catastrophic - every US$1 drop in 
oil price costs US$700 million in Venezuelan government revenues.228 As 70% of consumer goods 
including food come from imports,229 Venezuela has to earn foreign currency by selling oil in 
international markets in exchange for imports. To balance the fiscal budget, Venezuelan 
government needs oil price to rebound to US$125 per barrel,230 which is a remote distance.  
 
 
All sorts of economic problems have emerged when oil price crashed starting from June 2014.231 
Venezuela has the world’s worst negative growth rate of -8%.232 Its foreign currency reserves have 
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dropped more than threefold from the peak of US$43.07 billion in 2008 to US$13.2 billion in April 
2016, the lowest since 2003.233 Its foreign debt has risen to a strikingly high level of US$120 
billion.234 The country’s employment markets, supported by Venezuelan government’s extensive 
investment in public sectors, 235  have slashed jobs after the government drastically cut the 
expenditure. Unemployment rate is expected to climb from 6.7% in 2014236 to 17% in 2016 
and 21% in 2017.237 President Nicolás Maduro Moros responded to the hole in public finances by 
printing more and fueling hyperinflation.238 It is estimated that inflation has risen from 68.5% in 
2014239 to 180.9% in 2015240, 720% in 2016241 and to a whopping 1,642% in 2017242, the highest 
on earth. 243 
 
Austerity measures triggering social unrest  
 
In response to the severe economic crisis, Venezuelan government has declared a state of 
emergency 244  and implemented extreme austerity measures. It cuts welfare expenditures, 
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introduces basic foodstuff ration and withholds imports of food and medical products.245 Food is 
transported under armed guard.246 It enforces draconian price control to curb inflation that leads to 
widespread shortage of basic necessity. 247  Three-quarter empty supermarkets are being 
ransacked by hungry, angry mob.248 To prop up the ailing economy, it runs through the dwindling 
gold reserves to service the debt and finance basic foodstuff. Nevertheless, with fast depleting 
gold reserves,249 Maduro government will have to default or stop importing food soon, both 
are catastrophic.  
 
 
If the Venezuela leaders were able to diversify its economy prior to the onset of oil price crisis, 
the results of today would have been a total difference. Nonetheless, during the Hugo Chávez’s 
years, the government failed to grasp the opportunity to expand the non-oil industry but spent the 
oil rent on more welfare to appease voters. 250  The Venezuelan leftist government was so 
obsessed with state-led economic development and chose to expropriate private companies 
and farmlands for nationalization programmes, further deterring private investments 251 
and discouraging private companies to explore non-oil businesses. Venezuela has failed to build a 
strong protective shield with a diversified economy and strong fiscal reserves against the oil 
price crash.  
 
 
Possible political meltdown 
 
Signs of political instability are in sight. Voters are fuming about Maduro government 
and showcase disenchantment with the current political system. Therefore the opposition party 
won a landslide victory in the Legislative Assembly election in December 2015. The general 
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members of public are actively calling for referendum to impeach President Maduro.252 Reports of 
protests and looting saw a quadruple increase, with a record of over 2,100 protests from January 
to April 2016.253 Though coup, civil war or change in the head of state has not happened yet, the 
incurable economic calamity has already triggered considerable social turmoil which may in the 
end bring about political instability in years to come.  
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Russia & Algeria today 
 
Today’s situation in Russia and Algeria is much less severe than that in Venezuela. Though both 
Russia and Algeria become more dependent on oil revenue than in the 1985, they have 
accumulated much stronger fiscal reserves and set up stabilization funds in the same year to 
withstand oil price shocks and the ensuing economic crises. Russia has had an oil stabilization 
fund in place since 2004 to save its wealth for a rainy day. Algeria has risen to the number 
fifteen country in the list of the largest foreign exchange reserves in 2015 and established an oil 
savings fund entitled “Fonds de Regulation des Recettes (FRR)” in 2004. Nevertheless, political 
turmoil seems to be only a distant prospect as both countries have not undergone any severe social 
unrest. However, the revenue crunch and the worsening economic situation propelled by the recent 
fall of the oil price may one day force the two governments to seek stringent austerity measures 
whilst heavily drawing on reserve funds. If that day arrives, Russia may experience a certain level 
of economic and political instability.   
 
 
Russia 
 
 
Oil has been as critical to the new Russian state as it was to the former Soviet Union. Russia is in 
some ways even more oil-dependent than its predecessor. Today oil makes up 54% of the total 
export shares of Russian trade254 and accounts for around 50% of government revenue. For every 
US$1 fall in the oil price, about US$1.4 billion is wide off Russian federal tax revenue.255 
The close correlation between oil price, value of the Ruble and the level of the stock market is 
striking and indicates that a massive fall in oil prices might well lead to a tumbling of the financial 
assets held by the Kremlin as their pattern of movement is so synchronized.256  
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2014 oil price crash: pushing Russia’s economy to the edge 
 
In the wake of the 2014 oil price crash, a number of projections have already pointed to the possible 
decline of the Russian economy. Oil price fluctuations from June 2014 have resulted in significant 
revenue losses in Russia and a minus 3.7% GDP growth in 2015.257 According to the Energy 
Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, even if oil prices rebound to US$80 per 
barrel, the economic growth of Russia will remain sluggish with a negative growth of around 0.5% 
to 1.5% in 2016 to 2017. The World Bank Report noted an estimated 10% drop in GDP in 2016.258 
The Russian economy could only achieve positive growth if the oil price were to rise above US$90 
per barrel, which seems to be a forlorn hope.259 
 
 
No doubt the Russian economy has already felt the pain of the 2014 oil price shock. The Finance 
Minister of Russia said the Kremlin Government will face a fiscal deficit if oil is priced below 
US$82 per barrel. Deutsche Bank AG estimated in January 2016 that the break-even price for 2015 
was US$73.10 and US$66.10 in 2016, both higher than the oil price of today.260   
 
 
Meanwhile, Russians saw their real wages decline by 9.5% compared to 2014. 261  The 
unemployment rate climbed to 5.58% in 2015 and is estimated to reach 6.5% in 2016.262 The 
decline in real income has further aggravated the already-serious poverty problem. The poor 
population has increased by 3.1 million to 19.2 million in 2015, equivalent to 13.4% of the total 
population.263 Continuous erosion of living standards and the social safety net will pose a serious 
threat to the legitimacy of the regime.  
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Future of Soviet Union 
 
The question remains however whether Russia will follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, 
with the economy finally going bust and people demanding fundamental changes to the political 
system. One thing is certain. Russia has taken heed of lessons learnt during the 1985 oil price clash 
and established the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation in 2004 to balance the budget 
and stabilize the economy in times of oil and natural gas price drops.264 
 
 
This “rainy days” fund, which was also dubbed the “Oil Stabilization Fund”, was established in 
the challenging year of 2004 when oil hit a record low of US$27 per barrel. The aim of the fund was 
to provide a cushion against falling oil prices by converting crude oil export revenue, tax 
and investments into foreign government bonds. This corresponded to one-fourth or one-third of 
the overall oil revenue from 2004 to 2005. Money was then used to cover the government budget 
deficit should the oil price fall below the government budget breakeven price.265 The fund saw a 
promising growth of US$3.73 billion to US$157.38 billion in the first four years.266 It was later 
split into two sovereign wealth coffers: the Reserve Fund for oil stabilization (aka “Oil 
Stabilization Fund”) and the National Wealth Fund for pensions.267 
 
 
Will the country stand or fall?  
 
Whether oil price crashes will engender any economic crises in Russia is very much dependent on 
the resilience of the Oil Stabilization Fund. Stricken by oil’s collapse to the lowest price in more 
than twelve years, both the sovereign funds, held at the high level of US$87 billion at the start of 
2014, quickly shrank by half in February 2016.268 Russia’s 2015 budget drew on the Revenue 
Fund to the tune of US$53 billion in order to fund government programmes.269 It is predicted that 
Russia will exhaust its Reserve Fund to cover the fiscal deficit by 2017 and start to draw upon the 
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National Wealth Fund, which stood at US$73 billion in July 2016.270 Nevertheless, redirecting the 
social security fund to plug the gap in the budget is risky in the long run. Henceforth, whether the 
Funds will be strong enough to funnel sufficient money for social spending and to prop up Russia’s 
economy must be matters of conjecture. When an oil revenue crunch co-mingled with sanctions 
imposed by the West, Russia is quickly faced with forecasts of gloom and doom about its economic 
stability.  
 
 
Another major factor is the possibility of diverting the economy away from oil exports. 
Immediately after the oil price plunge, the Kremlin government launched an anti-crisis plan 
by cutting government expenditure. As Nouriel Roubini rightly points out, Russia’s economy 
fluctuated with the price of oil and gas. It needs to diversify itself with the privatization of state-
owned enterprise, liberalization of the whole economy, a reduction in red tape and the number of 
trade barriers that hamper the creation of new businesses and the development of the domestic 
market.271 However, there is no sign of any kind of holistic reform which might be able to keep 
the economy afloat without a heavy reliance on oil income.   
 
 
Protracted economic pain without a determination to reform Russia's economic base will upset the 
long-standing bargain that President Vladimir Putin has with his people: prosperity in exchange 
for political passivity.272 Although it is too early to tell whether political instability will take place 
in Russia in the near future, the risk is rising as more mass protests have erupted since Putin 
assumed his third term presidency in 2012.273 If the oil price continues to remain at the low level 
it is today, Russia may have a bumpy road to endure on the way to maintaining political stability.  
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Algeria  
 
Just as in Russia, Algeria set up an oil stabilization fund in 2004 to create a shock absorber against 
oil price volatility. Although the economic structure of Algeria has not changed much since 
the crash in 1985, the strong reserve has enabled the country to fare much better in terms of 
economic performance and political stability in today’s situation.   
 
 
Oil remains the lifeblood of today’s Algeria  
 
After three decades, Algeria is still a centralized economy with predominant reliance on the oil 
and gas sector. Today, revenue from the oil and gas sector accounts for more than 95% of Algeria’s 
total export earnings, around 60% of government income and 30% of the country’s GDP.274 
Similar to Venezuela, Algeria has to import massive amount of goods, including foodstuffs due to 
its undiversified economy and under-developed non-oil sectors. High oil prices in the past decade 
have allowed the Algeria government to support calm restive populations and assuage social 
tensions by paying massive import bills, feeding its people, funding all sorts of social welfare 
and government programmes.  
 
 
As Algeria’s general economy and government funds are so intertwined with oil prices, when oil 
prices drop, the country encounters dramatic consequences. For every US$1 drop in oil price, 
Algerian will suffer a loss of US$560 million per year.275 According to IMF, Algeria needs to sell 
oil at US$96.1 per barrel in order to balance its budget in 2015.276 Ironically, such a figure is 
unlikely to be reached in the coming years when the current crude oil price is forecast to hover 
around US$40 to US$50 per barrel. 
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Oil price crash straining Algeria’s economy 
 
Plunging oil prices since June 2014 have already strained Algeria’s economy. The 
undiversified economy of Algeria is unable to offset the impact of the steep decline in oil revenue. 
Export revenue from the oil and gas sector has decreased more than 40%, from US$60.3 billion in 
2014 to US$35.7 billion in 2015,277 and will probably fall further to US$26 billion in 2016.278 As 
the Algerian government has not prepared for a long period of price shock and lingering low prices, 
it has not implemented any fiscal consolidation programmes and has thus aggravated the country’s 
budget deficits.279 The budget deficit in 2015 nearly doubled in a year, widening from 6.2% in 
2014 to 11.5% of GDP. Despite the implementation of tight monetary policy, inflation has 
increased more than 120%, rising from 3.9% in 2014 to 4.8% in 2015, and is expected to remain 
above 4% throughout 2016 and 2017.280 The unemployment rate has increased from 10.6% in the 
third quarter of 2014 to 11.2% in the third quarter of 2015. Youth unemployment is the most 
serious, peaking at 29.9%.281 
 
 
Future: political turmoil?  
 
The 1985 oil price slump led to the outbreak of civil war in Algeria, resulting in an 
estimated 200,000 death toll. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely the current Algeria government will 
follow in the footsteps of its predecessor of the late 1980s. As with Russia, the negative financial 
impact brought by the price plunge has been alleviated by relatively strong fiscal reserves. 
 
 
Fiscal reserves and FRR: backing Algeria’s government  
 
Same as Russia, oil price volatility prompted Algeria to set up the “Fonds de Regulation des 
Recettes” (FRR) in 2004. Substantial hydrocarbon proceeds were injected to the Fund to cushion 
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against revenue loss when the price was low. It was also perceived as an oil stabilization fund to 
provide support for government expenditure in a time of oil shocks. The Fund had accumulated a 
total of US$77.2 billion in June 2013.282 Despite the budget deficit running since 2009, Algeria 
experienced less financial pressure and fewer economic reverberations because of its relatively 
stronger fiscal position than that held in 1985.  
 
 
Moreover, the Algerian government could count on the FRR and foreign reserves to address 
domestic threats, ease social tensions and to maintain political stability.283 The economy is in better 
shape than previously. The government has maintained surpluses of an average 7.7% of GDP 
between 1998 and 2008. 284 Despite the sluggish growth after the price crash, the GDP still grew a 
positive 3.8% in 2014 and 2.9% in 2015.285 Stronger reserves also allowed Algeria to repay nearly 
all its external debt – lowering the debt from 60% of GDP in 2000 to less than 5% of GDP in 2014. 
286 
 
 
Even during the outbreak of Arab Spring in 2011, Algeria’s government was able to cope with 
massive riots and domestic shocks through heavy spending on social welfare, including the 
provision of housing vouchers, increasing the salary of public employees irrespective of 
performance287 and offering zero-interest loans to unemployed young people.288 Although the 
FRR declined by more than 30% between 2013 and 2015289 and the reserves pool has been cut to 
a new low of US$145 billion in late 2015, thus seeing a 30% drop when compared to the peak of 
US$201 billion in December 2013, Algeria’s foreign reserves remain the world’s fifteen largest as 
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of 2015. 290 The existing pool will allow Algeria to sustain a deficit budget without extra borrowing 
in the next decade. 291  
 
 
It is also true to say that Algeria’s government has not rested on its laurels and has rolled out certain 
austerity policies after the 2014 price cut. It has slowly and steadily reduced imports by 15% in 
2016 with a view to decelerating the fast depletion of fiscal reserves.292 To alleviate financial 
pressure, the government has also announced a cut in expenditures by 9% in 2016 293  by 
reducing certain subsidies, such as those for fuel, electricity and mobile phone subscription.294 
Small-scaled reforms are getting underway. For examples, the government has introduced tax 
measures to boost productive investment and streamlined protocols to foster an inviting 
business climate. 295 
 
 
Economic diversification is not in sight 
 
The temptation of easy oil wealth will often lure short-sighted leaders into a dangerous position as 
they tend to embrace short-term economic policies and resist any drastic reforms for fear of the 
political cost. Large-scale structural economic reforms similar to the holistic reforms undertaken 
by the Indonesia government are not envisaged. Although the Prime Minister of Algeria has 
urged his country to reduce reliance on oil revenue, few practical steps have been taken to do so.296 
 
 
To sum up, much stronger fiscal reserve enabled Algeria to cope with external and domestic shocks 
during the 2014 price slump and averted an economic crisis in the short-run. Though 
demonstrations took place, the painful memory of civil war and the “Black Decade” is still vivid in 
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the minds of the public. The current sentiment has not yet reached a critical point to spark any 
nationwide protests. Nevertheless, if the economy continues to worsen with fiscal reserves 
depleted sufficiently quickly to threaten the living standards of Algerians, a public outcry may 
finally lead to political instability.  
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Saudi Arabia today 
 
Whilst applying the theory to the Saudi Arabia of today, one will observe an interesting difference 
when compared with the situation of 1985. As one of the world’s richest countries with an 
entrenched reliance on oil, Saudi Arabia has suffered badly in the 2014 oil price crash and the 
subsequent low prices. To surmount the extreme challenge, ironically, the Kingdom can no longer 
enjoy the benefits of strong fiscal reserves as it did in the old days. IMF has even issued a warning 
that the Kingdom could go bankrupt by 2020. The landslide slip in oil revenues has become a 
wake-up call for Saudi Arabia to embrace an economic diversification strategy. It remains to be 
seen if Saudi Arabia is doing enough to deal with the looming economic crisis and to avert any 
political backlash by means of economic reforms.    
 
 
Oil, building block of the Kingdom 
 
The grim prognosis for Saudi’s economy is that it is almost completely dependent on oil. Despite 
the 1985 oil shock, the situation has not changed much in three decades. Oil and gas still account 
for about 86% of total exports297 and contribute 50% of the Kingdom’s GDP298. The oil price has 
ranged between US$20 and $50 a barrel since 2014 oil price crash and the Kingdom can hardly 
balance the budget when the price slips below US$100 per barrel.299  
 
 
 
2014 oil price crash: testing Saudi’s resilience to price volatility  
 
Saudi Arabia is facing an immense financial pressure unseen in the late 1980s. Its fiscal reserves 
may not be large enough to withstand the economic assault if the trend continues unchecked. 
Although Saudi had a twenty-eight-fold growth in foreign exchange reserves, from US$26.5 
billion in 1985 to US$748 billion in August 2014,300 an extreme population explosion in the last 
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four decades301 has exerted tremendous pressure on its public finances. After the drop in oil 
revenue following the price crash, Riyadh’s fiscal reserves dived from its peak at US$748 billion 
in August 2014, to US$593 billion in March 2016, with more than US$150 billion disappearing 
within a short period of time. 302  The Saudi government announced a budget shortfall of 
SR$367 billion in December 2015 (equivalent to US$98 billion and accounting for 15% of the 
Kingdom’s GDP) and is projected to continue running a budget deficit of SR$326 billion 
(equivalent to US$87 billion) in 2016.303 IMF warned that the Kingdom will run out of financial 
reserves and go bankrupt by 2020 if it continues its current spending pattern.  
 
 
Increasing social unrest?  
 
To combat a ballooning deficit, Saudi Arabia has launched a series of austerity budget plans. One 
of them is to cut jobs. For several decades, over two-thirds of its labor force has been absorbed by 
the bloated public sector. 304  Under the current unfavorable economic conditions, 10% of 
government jobs were cut between 2014 and 2015.305 For example, Saudi Binladin Group, a state-
owned construction firm, plans to cut 12,000 out of 17,000 positions taken up by Saudi citizens.306 
The Job market is shrinking fast in 2016 due to Saudi’s government expenditure cuts. Meanwhile, 
the employment of Saudi citizens in the private sector has also dropped 38%. 307  Currently, 
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around one-third of young people aged below 25 are unemployed. 308 This figure has yet to include 
an influx of another six millions of new young additions to the workforce by 2030.309
 
 
 
 
Austerity policies encompassed cuts in domestic subsidies and welfare, from water, energy 
and health to retirement pensions in early 2016. The Saudi government plans to increase the price 
of daily utilities. For example, the government will increase the prices of transport diesel by 79%, 
low-grade gasoline by 67% and industrial diesel by 55% in the next five years.310 The move is 
expected to generate US$30 billion of state income by 2020.311 
 
 
The Saudis populace is accustomed to one of the highest standards of living on earth. The 
implementation of new austerity plans will lead to growing public unrest. With a decline in social 
spending and a reduction in subsidies comes the risk of rising domestic turmoil, as highlighted by 
the Arab Spring in 2011, when high inflation, lower growth and inequality resulted in mass 
demonstrations across the Middle East.   
 
 
Economic diversification:  
“we can live in 2020 without any dependence on oil” 312  
 
To buck the trend of economic downfall, Riyadh is trying to re-bolster its economy by means of 
economic diversification, with the goal of reducing its oil dependence. The Saudi government 
announced “Vision 2030” - a blueprint to utilize oil revenue to achieve economic diversification, 
encourage private sector development and create jobs for millions of Saudi youths. According to 
Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom should break its addiction to 
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oil and “live in 2020 without any dependence on oil.”313 The master plan paints a rosy picture with 
the establishment of a $2 trillion sovereign wealth fund to fund the reforms by disposing of the 
Kingdom’s petroleum assets, which is the first time this has happened in history. It is 
even considering listing shares in its enormous state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco, in a bid to 
raise funds by 2018. 314 It is estimated that an IPO of Saudi Aramco could raise $106 billion to the 
sovereign wealth fund. The Saudi government has also declared a new set of targets, such as 
increasing non-oil exports from 16% to 50% of GDP and increasing non-oil revenue from 
SR$163.5 billion (US$43.6 billion) to SR$1 trillion (US$267 billion) by 2030. 315  State-
owned assets and agencies will also be restructured. That said, the present reform is not a maiden 
move. The Saudi Government has tried to adopt economic changes, calling for a boost of non-oil 
sectors, in the past, mostly without success. As the soon as oil prices rebound, they sit back 
and relax.316  
 
 
In conclusion, the current oil price collapse has not destabilized the Kingdom. The existing 
US$593 billion of fiscal reserves can still support the Kingdom’s operations for the next several 
years. Nevertheless, doom day will fall if the fiscal reserves are used up and social disruption 
increases when more austerity policies are rolled out. If the economic diversification 
programmes cannot be successfully implemented, it is questionable how long Saudi can prop up 
its faltering economy and maintain political stability if the oil price continues remaining so low. 
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Indonesia  
 
 
Today, Indonesia is hailed as an eminent success in economic diversification. The World Bank has 
even lauded Indonesia as “one of the most amazing examples of structural adjustment in the 
developing world, with important lessons for other Third World countries”. 317 Amongst the 
five countries in this study, Indonesia is the only case in point which has completely freed itself 
from oil dependence.  
 
 
Exports of crude oil, gas and energy products, which once constituted 80% of total exports in the 
1980s, have dropped to 16% in 2014. As mentioned in the earlier section, since 1980s the 
momentum to drive the country’s growth has been steered away from oil to agricultural, 
manufacturing and diverse natural resources, to sources of wealth beyond oil.   
 
 
In 2014, total exports of Indonesia reached US$197 billion, which made the country the world’s 
25th largest exporter.318 Exports of footwear and clothing, high-tech products, automobile parts as 
well as agricultural products like coffee, tea, shrimp, fish, and spices have become the new growth 
engine. With the growing domestic oil demand to fuel its economic drive, Indonesia is no longer 
a petro-state. It turned itself into a net oil importer in 2014, with oil imports exceeding exports.319 
 
 
The underlying cause of economic and political stability in petro-states thirty years ago was a 
sudden collapse in the price of oil coupled with an over-dependence on oil revenues. Indonesia 
will not join the ranks of Venezuela or other petro-states, which all generally decline when the oil 
price falls.  It is the country that performs the best out of the five petro-states we have chosen, in 
terms of GDP growth and economic prosperity. An oil price crash no longer affects Indonesia’s 
stability as severely as before because the country has freed itself from the oil price trap by means 
of economic diversification.  
 
Conclusion 
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The oil price crash of 1985 engendered a serious economic setback and a political backlash to a 
broad swathe of petro-states. While low oil prices inflicted economic pain on 
and caused unprecedented political strains in certain petro-states, many government leaders 
failed to take heed of the previous crises and to prevent the countries from falling into the oil 
revenues trap. They still live in the illusion that generous oil revenues would save the day. 
 
 
As the latest oil price crash began to unfold in the June 2014, petro-states like Russia, Saudi Arabia 
and Algeria have been suffering various degrees of economic backlash and looming political woes. 
Venezuela is almost at the verge of a complete state collapse. The only exception is Indonesia 
which has embarked on a different path, with a promisingly diversified economy. Volatility in oil 
prices and disheartening oil earnings no longer pose a serious threat to this country. 
 
 
No doubt, it is hard for any oil state to foresee and turn around a trend of falling oil prices. 
Nevertheless, any country can avert a perilous future if its government is visionary enough to 
amass a substantial amount of wealth to defend against oil price slumps as well as to reform the 
economy in a timely and efficient manner to spare the state from economic calamity and political 
downfall. 
 
 
Nevertheless, it is an extremely daunting task for a petro-state to make the transition away from 
oil dependence. A complete departure from oil export dominance will require the leadership to 
possess exceptional gumption in order to overcome internal conflicts and, in some cases, to counter 
the resistance from politicians and the ruling class with their entrenched vested interests.  
 
 
However, there is no gain possible without the endurance of a certain amount of pain. History has 
already presented a prognosis of the future. If governments of the petro-states are reluctant to take 
drastic steps to free themselves from the oil revenue trap, history is bound to repeat itself. The 
notion is well represented in the cases of today: the days of Venezuela appear to be numbered; 
Russia, Algeria and even the once secure oil kingdom of Saudi Arabia will gradually fall apart 
economically and politically when the once-solid reserves dwindle to an alarming level. Only 
substantial fiscal reserves and a successfully diverse economy can free these petro-states from the 
paradox of plenty.  
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